

Tomorrow's Neighbors: Strategies for Temporary Refugee Integration in Athens, Greece

ANNALISA GALGANO*

Social Research and Public Policy, New York University Abu Dhabi, UAE

Abstract

In 2015, Greece became the gateway for an unprecedented migration influx into Europe. Between 2015 and 2016, over one million migrants, many of whom were refugees, entered Greece via the Mediterranean Sea. After Greece's northern borders closed and the European Union signed a migration agreement with Turkey in March 2016, an estimated 60,000 asylum seekers found themselves unwillingly confined in Greece, where the asylum application process can last from several months to over a year. This paper discusses the need for temporary refugee integration and seeks to answer the questions: what are the main barriers to refugee integration in Athens, and in what ways can policymakers facilitate the temporary integration of refugees into the city? Data for this study was collected during two rounds of field interviews in Athens in the summer and winter of 2016. Respondents were sampled from three categories: refugees (n=46), direct service providers working for governmental or non-governmental organizations (n=27), and independent volunteers (n=13). These conversations revealed many barriers to refugee integration in Athens, including poor employment prospects, secluded refugee accommodation, and refugees' general reluctance to stay in Greece. However, several factors that could potentially improve integration prospects were identified, including English and Greek language learning, mentorship from other migrants, and stable accommodation options. This paper concludes with a series of policy recommendations for the municipal government and non-governmental service providers to encourage the temporary integration of refugees in Athens.

Keywords: Refugees, Integration, Greece

I. INTRODUCTION

"We realized it was time to stop engaging in aid and start thinking about integration, because the borders were closing and it became obvious to us that today's refugees were going to be tomorrow's neighbors."

Nadina Christopoulou, Melissa Network
Co-founder

IN 2015, Greece became the gateway for an unprecedented migration influx into Europe. Between 2015 and 2016, over one million refugees and migrants entered Greece via the Mediterranean Sea with the goal of seeking asylum in Europe (UNHCR, 2017a).¹

While most of these refugees merely sought to transit through Greece to other European countries, in March 2016 neighboring countries closed their borders and the European Union (EU) signed an agreement with Turkey that allowed for the detention and deportation of asylum seekers. These circumstances have blocked tens of thousands of refugees from traveling outside of Greece. Due to the closed Balkan borders and a mounting backlog of asylum applications, the Greek government and service providers are currently faced with the task of processing, temporarily housing, schooling, and integrating an estimated 60,000 people who cannot make their way to Northern Europe.

Existing policy paradigms recognize three "durable solutions" for refugee influxes: resettlement, repatria-

*I would like to express my deep gratitude to Professor Sophia Kalantzakos, whose mentorship, supervision, and investment in my personal development have powerfully impacted my research and future aspirations. I would also like to thank my mentor, Professor Eric Hamilton, for his time, advice, and guidance during the research and writing process. Thank you to Sotiris Petropoulos and HIGGS for supporting our summer fieldwork with advice, key introductions, and a dynamic office space. To Esmie Papadimitriou, thank you for your contributions to the summer fieldwork and translation of Greek interviews. Thank you to the other interpreters who facilitated interviews with refugees in Athens: Professor Rana Tomaira, Professor Michael Cooperson, Yazan Jeralti, Tariq Wady, and Mohammad Mirzay. Your services ensured that the findings of this paper captured the voices and viewpoints of refugees. To Yazan Jeralti and Mina Mohit, thank you for assisting me with accessing various field sites whilst sharing your own experiences. I am also deeply grateful to the anonymous refugees, volunteers, and service providers who voluntarily and generously took the time to participate in this research project. This project was funded by the Division of Social Sciences at New York University Abu Dhabi.

¹In this paper, the term "refugee" is used according to the 1951 Refugee Convention to refer broadly to those who have been granted special humanitarian status, formal refugee status, or those whose asylum applications have not yet been determined (UNHCR, 1951). Most refugees described in this paper are in this last category, as they applied for asylum in Greece and are awaiting a decision on their application.

tion, or local integration (UNHCR, 1997). In this model, local integration is traditionally understood to be a long-term, state-facilitated process that often leads to refugee citizenship in the host country. However, a growing body of refugee scholarship recognizes that integration is not necessarily long-term nor state-driven. Increasingly, researchers are exploring refugees' own unofficial methods of integrating in their host communities. These de facto integration strategies may provide useful insights for policymakers, governments, or organizations who seek to facilitate refugee integration more effectively.

In the case of Athens, these insights are critical in shaping policies for the temporary integration of refugees into the city. Although many refugees are only in Greece temporarily, it is still valuable to consider ways in which provisional refugee integration policies may ease the negative effects of the refugee influx while empowering refugees to thrive, both in Greece and/or in their final host country.

In this study, 86 refugees, service providers, and volunteers in Athens were interviewed using semi-structured questionnaires. The purpose of these conversations was to answer the questions: What are the main barriers to refugee integration in Athens? And in what ways can policymakers facilitate the temporary integration of refugees into the city? By sharing their grounded perspectives on integration in Athens, refugees and service providers were able to define their own challenges and identify opportunities for policy improvement. The findings from these interviews are then categorized and discussed according to nine integration indicators: employment, housing, education, health, language, social networks, cultural knowledge, ability to navigate the city, and willingness to stay in Greece.

This paper concludes with a series of policy recommendations based upon the research findings. It is impossible, or at least unethical, to divorce refugee research from a discussion of policy (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2014; Harrell-Bond, 1986). This paper recognizes the "dual imperative" to incorporate research with policy relevance (Jacobsen & Landau, 2003). As Voutira and Doná (2007) write, "In refugee studies, scholarship is embedded in advocacy and advocacy in scholarship." This research is grounded in the bottom-up perspec-

tive of refugees, service providers, and volunteers in the field. Their insights, frustrations, and suggestions inform this paper's policy recommendations for government and service providers to better facilitate the temporary integration of refugees in Athens.

II. BACKGROUND

Although migration from the Middle East to Greece is not a new phenomenon, the scale of the 2015-16 refugee influx into Greece is unprecedented.² Over one million people entered Greece via the Mediterranean Sea in 2015 and 2016 with the goal of applying for asylum in the EU. Over 75% of the new arrivals were refugees from Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq displaced by ongoing conflicts in their home countries (Clayton & Holland, 2015). Although these conflicts began in 2011, 1978, and 2003, respectively, Europe did not experience a spike in mass migration until 2015. Several factors may have contributed to this sudden influx, including the escalation of the Syrian civil war, the oversaturation of refugees in Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey, and forcible returns of Afghans from neighboring countries such as Pakistan. The Syrian civil war has displaced around 11 million civilians since 2011 (Migration Policy Centre, 2016), and until the summer of 2015, Syrians primarily sought refuge in the neighboring countries of Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey, which have struggled to absorb the massive influx of refugees. In June 2016, over 2.7 million Syrian refugees resided in Turkey, one million in Lebanon, and 655,000 in Jordan (UNHCR, 2016). Jordan and Turkey have since closed their shared borders with Syria and have violently and lethally repelled would-be refugees.³ Refugees already within Turkey face harsh detention conditions, limitations to joining the labor force, and barriers to applying for asylum (Roman, Baird, & Radcliffe, 2016). These conditions perhaps contributed to the numbers of refugees leaving Turkey to cross the Mediterranean Sea for Greece.

The journey across the Mediterranean is notoriously dangerous. From 2015-2016, nearly 9,000 people died attempting to make the journey (UNHCR, 2017a). Refugee flows to Greece peaked in October 2015, a month that saw over 200,000 refugee arrivals. Several international humanitarian organizations, including Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) urged the EU

²In this paper, the term "refugee influx" is used rather than "refugee crisis." Despite the widespread usage of the term "crisis" in the media and political discourse, I intentionally avoid "crisis language." Lawrance (2016) argues that while crisis language may serve to mobilize a rapid humanitarian response, this sensational term "ushers in hasty responses, stimulates fraught political rhetoric, and resonates with persistent national and international political, economic, social, cultural, and religious tensions." By avoiding the term "crisis," I hope to also avoid the implication that European states lack the capacity to proactively address the refugee situation.

³An estimated 85,000 refugees are currently interned in "the berm," a makeshift refugee holding area at border between Jordan and Syria, where even emergency humanitarian aid is often blocked (Arraf, 2016). In addition to constructing a concrete and razor-wire wall on its border with Syria, Turkey has also lethally shot over 15 Syrian refugees, both adults and children, attempting to cross into safety (Smith, 2016).

to provide "safe passage" so that asylum seekers would not have to pay smugglers and make the treacherous journey in order to apply for refugee status in the EU.

EU member states disagreed on the best response to the refugee arrivals. In August 2015, Chancellor Angela Merkel adopted an "Open Door Policy" towards refugees, and it was announced that Germany expected to welcome up to 800,000 refugees by the end of 2015 (Heisbourg, 2015). This policy marked a voluntary waiver of the Dublin Regulation, the EU policy which requires refugees to apply for asylum inside the country where they first entered the European Union. Although Merkel's Open Door Policy initially received enormous domestic support, other European leaders including Hungarian President Viktor Orbán accused Germany of attracting more economic migrants to the EU and increasing unwelcome migration flows throughout Hungary and other neighboring countries.⁴ Many European leaders' concerns about the refugee influx intensified further in November 2015 after a coordinated terror attack in Paris that killed 130 people. Although all of the known attackers were EU citizens, at least two of the perpetrators had traveled to Europe via refugee boat in October 2015 using fake Syrian passports (Darwish & Magdy, 2015). This revelation further polarized European countries' positions on accepting refugees from Greece.

With incoming refugees using Greece as their gateway to Europe, other European countries blamed Greece for swelling refugee numbers across the continent. In response to the continued influx, the European Commission issued 50 recommendations in January 2016 for Greece to better control its borders and stem refugee flows. Because the majority of refugees arriving via the Mediterranean merely transited through Greece to other European countries, the Commission threatened Greece with exclusion from the Schengen free zone, which allows for document-free travel between member states (European Commission, 2016a). Though Europe's common asylum system theoretically ensures equal and adequate reception conditions for refugees in any EU country, Greece did not have the capacity to effectively process incoming refugees. In response to the European Commission report, Greek Defense Minister Panos Kammenos accepted increased border management support from Frontex, the European border agency, and oversaw the establishment of refugee-processing hotspots on the islands of Lesbos, Kos, Samos, Leros, and Chios. These hotspots served as

reception centers for refugees arriving in Greece and ensured the fingerprinting and registration of new arrivals (Reuters, 2016).

In March 2016, the closing of the Greek-Macedonian border blocked secondary movements of asylum seekers attempting to leave Greece to seek refugee status in other European countries. In the same month, EU leaders finalized an agreement with Turkey based on a "one for one" model. According to the deal, the EU could deport each asylum seeker who had irregularly entered the EU back to Turkey. In exchange, the EU would accept one refugee through the formal application procedure, offer more financial assistance for Turkey's refugee population, and increase EU visa access for Turkish nationals. This arrangement was not only designed to deter migrants from making the journey from Turkey to Greece, but it also aimed to pacify Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who had been making frequent threats that Turkey could send Europe even more refugees on "buses and planes" (Greenhill, 2016). As a result of the closed borders and the new EU-Turkey arrangement, an estimated 60,000 asylum seekers found themselves unwillingly confined in Greece (Harris, 2016).

The arrangement between the EU and Turkey was immediately denounced by many international humanitarian organizations, including the UNHCR, Amnesty International, the International Rescue Committee, the Norwegian Refugee Council, MSF, and Save the Children. Several organizations, including the UNHCR and MSF, suspended their activities on the Greek islands, refusing to assist in the operations of refugee reception facilities which, under the EU-Turkey deal, had become unlawful detention centers for refugees (Kingsley, 2016). Additionally, Turkey is not a full signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention, which, among other provisions, guarantees refugees the right to work. Another concern was that Turkey should not be considered a "safe third country" for refugees, as Turkey had a track record of forcibly returning asylum seekers to their countries of origin, including Afghanistan, despite significant threats to their lives in these countries.

In June 2016, the UNHCR began pre-registration in refugee camps, a process which allows asylum seekers to schedule their first asylum interviews. Asylum seekers in official government or humanitarian camps could pre-register in person. Meanwhile, those in informal camps, squats, or apartments attempted to contact the asylum service via Skype during a weekly three-hour

⁴While refugees are protected under international law as vulnerable people fleeing violence or persecution, economic migrants are those who migrate elsewhere to improve their standard of living. Because they are not considered a vulnerable group, they are not entitled to entry or benefits from another country. A persistent debate among European political leaders is whether those entering the EU are refugees or economic migrants. This debate is crucial in defining the responsibilities of states towards incoming migrants.

window for Arabic or Farsi speakers. It often takes asylum seekers months to connect to an asylum official and schedule their first interview. Once asylum seekers pre-register, they are given the date of their first asylum interview appointment, which is generally scheduled for 5-7 months later. In 2016, over 51,000 applications were submitted by asylum seekers in Greece (Makris, 2017). Most Syrian asylum applicants are eligible for resettlement in another European country and apply for relocation. However, applicants of many nationalities, including Afghans and Iraqis, are not eligible for relocation, so they must choose between applying to stay in Greece or to risk paying a smuggler to facilitate secondary movements to other European countries.⁵ After their first interview, asylum applicants wait several more months for a preliminary decision on their case. In total, the time between arriving to Greece and receiving a decision on their asylum case can last over a year for many refugees.

This delay is partially due to the reluctance of other EU member states to help Greece resettle asylum seekers. Although EU member states agreed in 2015 to resettle 160,000 asylum seekers from Greece and Italy, only 8,162 people had been legally relocated by December 2016 (European Commission, 2016b). In October 2016, Hungarian voters overwhelmingly rejected a referendum regarding mandatory refugee quotas. Austria and the Visegrad group—the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Hungary—have also refused to accept any asylum seekers. Right-wing political parties in France, Germany, Austria, the United Kingdom, and Hungary have recently gained traction with anti-immigration platforms (Greven, 2016). This has perhaps made even sympathetic politicians across Europe wary of alienating voters by accepting more refugees.

In addition to its own right-wing Golden Dawn party, Greece has also experienced a rise in anti-immigrant attitudes since the beginning of its financial crisis. With an unemployment rate of 23% and a seven-fold increase in employee and pensioner taxes since 2009, instability in the Greek economy persists (OECD, 2016; Stamouli, 2015). The Migrant Integration Policy Index found that during the financial crisis, anti-immigrant sentiment in Greece increased sharply, with over two-thirds of Greek respondents believing that immigrants do not contribute economically or culturally to the country (MIPEX, 2015).

Despite these attitudes, there is still a need for refugee integration in Greece. Asylum seekers not

only have legal rights to accommodation, healthcare, employment, and education,⁶ but they also will be living alongside Greeks for the foreseeable future. Maria Stavropoulou, the Director of Greece's asylum service, announced in April 2017 that around 10,000 refugees will remain in Greece long-term (Makris, 2017). While the other 50,000 refugees currently in Greece may eventually resettle in other countries, most will stay in the EU and integrate in another host country. However, this resettlement process may take over a year, and empowering refugees to temporarily integrate in Greece will help them gain transferable intercultural skills while offsetting the financial cost of confining them in refugee camps. Refugee camps are likely to compound the trauma of refugee populations by heightening their vulnerability to sexual violence and health problems (Stanton, 2017). In contrast, refugees who are empowered to integrate with their host communities can learn integration skills, contribute to the local economy, and prepare themselves for their place as "tomorrow's neighbors."

III. LITERATURE REVIEW

Against this backdrop of the 2015 refugee influx in Greece, this section discusses the foundational academic literature relevant to refugee integration studies. This paper adds to the growing body of academic literature on integration strategies for refugees in Greece, with a particular focus on refugees' strategies for temporary self-integration and the importance of incorporating refugees' own perspectives into policy research.

The definition of integration continues to evolve within the field of refugee studies. Valtonen (1998) defines integration as "a process by which immigrants and refugees engage with, and become part of their resettlement society." Although this definition focuses primarily on the actions of refugees alone, recent literature has emphasized that integration is a two-way process requiring adaptation by both refugees and the host community in order to minimize social distance (Hollands, 2001; Stubbs, 1995). According to the UNHCR, a refugee is someone who has been forced to flee their country based on a well-founded fear of war, violence, or persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group. In this paper, the term "refugee" is used according to the 1951 Refugee Convention to refer broadly to those who have been granted special humanitarian status, formal refugee status, or those whose asylum

⁵In order to qualify for relocation within the EU, asylum applications from a given nationality must be accepted at least 75% of the time. Just under 70% of Afghan applications for asylum are granted, meaning that Afghans just miss the cutoff to be eligible for relocation (Psaropoulos, 2016). As of 2016, Iraqis also fell below the 75% threshold (EASO, 2017).

⁶These rights are affirmed in the 1951 Refugee Convention and EU Council Directive 2003/9/EC.

applications have not yet been determined (UNHCR, 1951).

Integration is traditionally considered a long-term "durable solution" to forced displacement (Hovil, 2014; Long, 2014; UNHCR, 1951). The UNHCR outlines voluntary repatriation, resettlement in a third country, or local integration as the three possible outcomes for refugees. However, local integration is usually discussed as a long-term process leading to citizenship in the country of resettlement (Hovil, 2014; Strang & Ager, 2010). There is some historical precedence of temporary refugee protection in the cases of refugees fleeing former Yugoslavia from 1992-1997 (Korac, 2001) and during the 1998 Kosovo crisis (Fitzpatrick, 2000). Additionally, the UNHCR recommends the temporary integration of refugees in certain cases when durable solutions are not immediately feasible.⁷

Despite this precedent, policy discussions of refugee integration generally do not consider migrants who must temporarily reside in one host country before accessing other durable solutions. In the case of Greece, many refugees who apply for resettlement in another European country must still reside in Greece for well over a year. Thus, these refugees are in need of temporary, provisional solutions while "durable" alternatives are pursued. Much of the literature concerning temporary economic migrants acknowledges that political and social integration is usually unsuccessful (Abella, 2006; Castles, 2006). Likewise, if refugees do not intend to stay long-term, traditional policy models of refugee integration are likely to fail, because durable solutions are not designed for temporary refugees (Losi & Strang, 2008). This paper builds upon the nascent discussion of temporary refugee protection with the goal of devising integration strategies specifically for short-term refugees.

Another emerging theme in refugee research focuses on refugees' unofficial, or *de facto*, integration strategies. Much of the existing research on refugee and migrant integration has traditionally approached the topic through the lens of refugee law, migration policy, and national politics (Akram et al., 2015; Black, 2003; Hammerstad, 2011). This literature generally discusses how legal refugee integration is facilitated by the state *de jure*. However, it is worthwhile to consider the ways in which refugees *de facto* integrate without state intervention (Hovil, 2014). More recent research has begun to focus on the unofficial local integration of self-settled

refugees (Bakewell, 2008; Briant & Kennedy, 2004; Jacobsen & Landau, 2003). *De facto* integration describes the informal ways in which refugees resourcefully and organically engage with the host community apart from official integration schemes. *De facto* integration is often illegal, particularly in states in which refugees are meant to be institutionalized in camps. Scheel and Squire (2014) point out that banning *de facto* integration is counterproductive, as this reduces refugees to either a humanitarian or law enforcement problem.

This paper proposes a third alternative to victimization or criminalization. Policymakers may find it useful to study the methods of refugee self-settlement and consider how state policies for temporary integration might also encourage independence and resourcefulness (Korac, 2003; Long, 2014) instead of dependence on government or humanitarian aid (Bakewell, 2008). However, Stein (1986) notes that many temporary host governments perceive refugees as a burden on the domestic economy, so they are unwilling to encourage the integration of temporary refugees, lest the refugees decide to stay long-term. This stance is ultimately uneconomical, as the cost of sequestering refugees in camps is borne entirely by governments, while integrating refugees into the local economy can lead to self-reliance and economic development (UNHCR, 1997). Additionally, many temporary refugee situations may be unforeseeably protracted due to ongoing violence or other geopolitical factors. While these temporary refugees still may not seek local citizenship, they can reside in the host country for several years. In this case, the social and economic integration of refugees is not only their right under the 1951 Refugee Convention, but it is also more economically sustainable for host countries.

This paper studies the temporary and *de facto* integration of refugees through interviews with refugees and service providers in Athens, Greece. Recently, academics have emphasized the importance of basing academic research on refugees' own perspectives of displacement (Kiagia, Kriona, & Georgaca, 2010; Papadopoulou, 2002; Puggioni, 2005). Increasingly, scholars are researching the integration of refugees through qualitative interviews with refugees themselves (Archer, Hollingworth, Maylor, Sheibani, & Kowarzik, 2005; Kiagia et al., 2010; Korac, 2003). This paper joins that trend, placing primary importance on refugees' firsthand accounts and their attitudes towards integration. As Valtonen (1998) notes, refugees themselves are the primary

⁷This recommendation, which is put forth in the 1997 UNHCR Standing Committee report, specifically applies to temporary refugee influxes in developing countries: "Where voluntary return is not immediately feasible, conditions should be created in the country of asylum for temporary settlement of the refugees and their participation in the social and economic life of the community, so they can contribute to its development. For the refugees it is essential to free themselves from dependence on relief, and reach a situation where they can take care of themselves, as soon as possible" (UNHCR, 1997).

agents and stakeholders in the integration process. As such, their own experiences, goals, and recommendations are most informative in academic analysis and integration policy formation.

Most of the foundational literature on refugees in Greece was written before the 2015 refugee influx (Kigagia et al., 2010; Papadimitriou & Papageorgiou, 2005; Papadopoulou, 2002; Sitaropoulos, 2002). These studies tend to focus on specific enclaves of migrants, such as Albanians, Afghans, or Kurds who have settled in Greece (Hatziprokopiou, 2003; Schuster, 2011; and Papadopoulou, 2002, respectively). More recent research since 2015 emphasizes the need for burden sharing and a coordinated EU refugee response (Hatton, 2015; Kousoulis, Tsoucalas, & Sgantzios, 2017). However, to my knowledge, no argument for temporary integration in Athens has yet been written based on refugees' own perspectives of displacement. This paper builds upon the growing body of literature that argues for the temporary protection of refugees and the incorporation of refugees' own perspectives in policy research. The insights gained from these interviews contribute to the academic discourse on refugee integration and are used to shape a series of policy recommendations for the integration of refugees in Athens.

IV. FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

Integration is multidimensional, involving many social, political, and economic outcomes that may be attained at different times and in varying degrees. Ager and Strang (2008) presented several key indicators of integration based on interviews with host populations and refugees themselves. This list includes employment, housing, education, health, language, social networks, and cultural knowledge. In this section, I discuss how I will analyze my data using these indicators and additional indicators identified during my fieldwork.

Employment: Participation in the local workforce is considered a central marker of integration because it not only compels interactions between refugees and citizens of the host country, but it also empowers refugees in a number of ways. Employment allows for economic independence, increases their ability to plan for the future, encourages self-reliance, and supports language development (Tomlinson & Egan, 2002). Losi and Strang (2008) found that refugees who have early access to vocational training and employment opportunities are more likely to achieve integration in other dimensions as well. Moreover, refugees with increased purchasing power can contribute to the local economy rather than consuming government resources. Despite the many positive effects of refugee integration into the work-

force, employment is also perhaps the most contested marker of integration because it can create tension and perceived competition for jobs within the host community. This drawback is particularly relevant to the Greek context, where nearly 25% citizens experience unemployment and over 35% of the population lives below the poverty line (Central Intelligence Agency, 2017).

In this analysis, employment outcomes are ranked according to the stability and financial remuneration of refugee work. Categories include: no employment, voluntary work, temporary paid work, and stable employment.

Housing: Refugee accommodation is both a physical and symbolic integration indicator. Refugees' living situations strongly impact the level of interaction they have with the host community. When refugee accommodation is more segregated from the local population, interaction between refugees and locals is less likely to occur. On a symbolic level, "A home is a place of safety, security and stability, the lack of which was the main reason refugees left their country of origin" (Dutch Refugee Council/ECRE 2001: 5, quoted in Ager & Strang, 2008). The stability and permanence of refugees' accommodation may also representative of their status within the host country. In this study, refugee accommodation is ranked according to permanence and centrality to the city. Refugee camps, which are by definition segregated from the city, are ranked the lowest, followed by squatted buildings within the city, then temporary housing, such as a friend's apartment or NGO-provided hotel rooms. Finally, stable accommodation, such as a personal apartment or a long-term apartment placement provided by an NGO, is ranked as the highest, most desirable housing status.

Health: Access to health services is a critical marker of integration, because poor mental and physical health is correlated with refugee isolation and vulnerability (Newbold, Cho, & McKeary, 2013). Refugees are more likely to face mental health issues and physical diseases than other immigrant classes (Gabriel, Morgan-Jonker, Phung, Barrios, & Kaczorowski, 2011), but Greece has had one of the poorest scores in the EU on the availability of health services to non-citizens even prior to the 2015 refugee influx (MIPEX, 2015). Although refugee respondents in this study were not directly asked about their experience with the Greek healthcare system, many service providers and refugees themselves cited health issues as barriers to integration within Greece. In this analysis, these comments are divided between medical health issues, psychological health concerns, and access to maternal healthcare.

Education: Ager and Strang (2008) included children's education as an integration indicator for both

adult and child refugees. For children, integration into the local school system fosters language development, social connection, and cultural understanding. Parents are also more likely to acquire these benefits if their children are in school, as they will likely connect with other parents and seek language skills to assist their child with schoolwork. This study categorizes education according to the availability and formality of educational opportunities pursued by refugees. In informal classes facilitated by NGOs or volunteers, children may be learning valuable language skills, but they do not have the official documentation to accredit their learning unless they are officially enrolled in school. As such, the lowest category for education is no classes at all, followed by informal classes provided by volunteers, then formal opportunities within the official Greek school system.

Language: Language was classified by Ager and Strang (2008) as an integration "facilitator." Not only is language a desirable outcome for integrated refugees, but it also enables refugees to attain most other integration outcomes. In the words of Hobfoll (1998), language acquisition leads to "resource acquisition spirals." Refugees sharing a common language with the host community are better equipped to access services, participate in the workforce, forge social connections, and navigate their surroundings. In this study, there are two levels of categorization for this integration marker. First, it is noted whether refugees prefer to learn English, Greek, or no language at all. Then, it is noted whether they learned this language prior to arrival in Greece or during their time in Greece.

Social Networks: Atfield, Brahmabhatt, and O'Toole (2007) argued that social networks help migrants and refugees attain three crucial resources for integration: information and material resources, emotional resources, and capacity building resources. The widening of social networks is associated with stronger trust in institutions and governance as well (Hynes, 2009). Categories for social networks in this analysis range from no social network, to co-ethnic social networks only, to friendships with foreign or Greek humanitarian volunteers within a camp or squat, to friendships with local Greeks outside of a camp or squat.

Cultural Knowledge: Ager and Strang (2008) identified cultural knowledge as an integration marker separate from language. Although language acquisition is critical for navigating one's host community, cultural knowledge refers to a broader understanding of local customs, procedures, and facilities. In this analysis, cultural knowledge is measured by how refugees draw comparisons between their home culture and Greek culture, their engagement with politics, and their knowl-

edge of local activities such as neighborhood markets or holidays.

In addition to this list of indicators from Ager and Strang, this paper also considers refugees' ability to independently navigate the city and their willingness to stay in Greece as additional integration indicators. Both of these additional markers were identified as integration outcomes through grounded fieldwork in Athens, as refugees themselves identified these two factors as relevant to their own integration process.

Ability to navigate the city: Although the ability to independently navigate the city is somewhat related to cultural knowledge, it is established as a separate category in this paper because this capability has immediate, positive implications for refugees in Athens, whereas cultural knowledge concerning local customs and politics is more essential for long-term integration. Refugees who feel confident in navigating the city are more likely to access services, develop social networks outside of camps, and carry out transactions with local shops. In this study, the ability to navigate Athens is measured by refugees' reported self-confidence in navigating and frequency of visiting the city.

Willingness to stay in Greece: Willingness to stay in Greece was added as an additional variable that functions in two ways. First, refugees' willingness to stay in Greece is indicative of their personal motivation to integrate. Those who are determined to leave the country are less likely to actively pursue integrative activities. Secondly, willingness to stay in Greece is also an observed outcome of integration within Athens. Those who have experienced a higher level of integration may also be more likely to prefer staying in Greece.

In this paper, I first discuss to what extent refugees are attaining these integration outcomes, using the 86 conversations with refugees, service providers, and volunteers as my primary data. Based on these findings, I then present a series of policy recommendations designed to foster further opportunities for integration.

V. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

This study seeks to answer the research questions: what are the main barriers to refugee integration in Athens? And in what ways can policymakers facilitate the temporary integration of refugees into the city? For the reasons discussed above, this paper places primary importance on the perspectives of refugees themselves in answering these questions.

The perspectives of service providers and volunteers in the field are also considered vital, as service providers can provide an outside perspective on refugee integration that is still grounded in firsthand observa-

tion and experience. Service providers and volunteers are also able to identify the practical challenges to implementing refugee integration policies. This paper adopts Lipsky's theory of "street-level bureaucracy" (1980). Lipsky argued that direct service workers are often the most informed about the efficacy of public policy, because they are charged with policy implementation and enforcement. As such, the perspective of service providers on the ground is essential to analyzing the merits and shortfalls of current refugee policy. This research utilizes a "backward mapping" strategy to analyze Greece's refugee policy. This perspective is critical, as humanitarian professionals and service providers are "change agents" whose role is vital to policy success, particularly in difficult conditions (Elmore, 1979).

I. Data Collection

Data for this study was collected during two rounds of field interviews in Athens: seven weeks of fieldwork in the summer of 2016, with a follow up visit during December 2016. Respondents were sampled from three categories: refugees, direct service providers working for governmental or non-governmental organizations, and independent volunteers. Of the 86 respondents in this study, 46 were refugees, 27 were direct service providers, and 13 were independent volunteers. Most conversations were conducted in person and audio-recorded, although some service provider and volunteer respondents preferred to answer questions over email or the phone. A variety of sampling methods were used to identify respondents from each category.

Criteria for inclusion in the "refugee" category are that the individual had migrated to Greece with the intention of seeking asylum in Europe, and that they could communicate in Greek, English, or through an Arabic or Farsi interpreter. The 46 refugees originated from Syria (n=35), Afghanistan (n=9), Palestine (n=1), and Iran (n=1). Respondents lived in various types of accommodation, from squats (n=18), government camps (n=10), NGO-run camps (n=5), subsidized apartments (n=6), personal or friends' apartments (n=5), or a host family (n=1).

Respondents were identified using snowball sampling and convenience sampling techniques. Key informants helped researchers gain access to the camps and squats and provided many introductions to participants. In other cases, strangers in the camps and squats were approached and asked for their informed consent to participate in the study. Interviews took place in a location of the respondents' choosing, generally in a private area of a camp or a café. Each respondent

was asked basic demographic information including age, nationality, length of stay in Greece, family members accompanying them in Greece, and benefits they were currently receiving from the government or humanitarian organizations. The rest of each conversation was semi-structured, focusing on the participants' individual experiences of learning language, finding work, housing, education, relations with Greeks, and plans to leave or stay in Greece. All conversations with refugees were recorded and subsequently transcribed. These 46 conversations with refugees lasted an average of 15 minutes, with seven interviews lasting longer than 30 minutes.

Service provider respondents were found using snowball sampling and selective sampling. Several service provider participants were identified via the personal networks of local informants, while others were selectively sampled from organizations using contact information found online. Service providers worked to support refugees in a variety of capacities, including facilitating housing programs, teaching language classes, providing medical or interpretation services, and organizing social activities for refugees. While each respondent's identity and organizational affiliation is anonymous in this study, their unique role in service provision guided each conversation differently. Most service provider interviews were conducted in person and audio-recorded. Of the 27 interviews with direct service providers, 22 were recorded and subsequently transcribed. Though all reasonable attempts were made to record the audio of each conversation, in certain cases (for example, due to security reasons at a governmental building), interviews were recorded by note-taking. The average duration of these interviews was 31 minutes, with 14 interviews lasting longer than 30 minutes.

Finally, volunteers were also identified using a mix of snowball sampling and selective sampling. Criteria for inclusion are that a respondent has worked with refugees in some capacity without compensation for at least a month during the preceding year. In several cases, volunteers had stopped providing services and had returned to their home country, so they preferred to email their answers to the questionnaire rather than have an in-person conversation. Of the 13 volunteer respondents, seven conversations were recorded. The average duration of these interviews was 38 minutes, with four interviews lasting longer than 30 minutes.

II. Data Analysis

Each conversation transcription was then analyzed according to the framework in the above section. Respondents' interview answers were classified by the nine

integration indicators included in the framework for analysis. Respondents' opinions regarding integration were connected to descriptive statistics such as age, gender, nationality, number of children, and housing type. Trends between these descriptive indicators and integration outcomes were noted. Additional relevant topics were also identified during the textual analysis of interview transcripts; these topics are included in the findings and discussion section of this paper.

In addition to the findings gleaned from conversations with refugees, service providers, and volunteers, this study includes observational data from time spent in refugee camps, squats, and public gathering spaces. The policy recommendations in this paper are informed by these insights as well.

III. Limitations

Because sampling methods in this study were non-random, respondents cannot be assumed to be demographically representative of the population of interest. This mixed-methods sampling approach was effective in identifying respondents, but this limitation must be kept in mind when attempting to generalize about the population of refugees, service providers, or volunteers. For example, the national backgrounds of refugee respondents in this study are not proportionally representative of the refugee population in Athens. While the experience of living in a refugee camp is likely similar for refugees of all national backgrounds, the small sample size of many nationalities prevents us from making significant conclusions about the uniqueness of their experiences.

VI. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

In this section, research findings are organized by each integration indicator. Each subsection includes a summary of research findings and a discussion regarding the barriers and opportunities to improving each integration marker. This section concludes with an additional discussion about why humanitarian organizations should not take primary responsibility for managing the refugee situation in Athens.

I. Employment

Throughout the interview process, refugees continually emphasized their desire to find productive work. In their view, employment is essential for dignity. One Greek volunteer explained that many refugees still prefer to identify themselves by their professional skills

rather than their refugee status. She relayed the following story:

There was a gentleman at the age of 50, senior, that was everyday dressed up with a very nice shirt. I do not know how he got the shirt always clean. He was moving to the kitchen he said, 'Hi, I am Hussein, I am a lawyer.'⁸ He kept saying he was a lawyer and then I realized that he kept saying he was lawyer because he didn't want to forget it himself. He didn't want to forget his identity, that he is very well educated.

As a result of this desire for dignity, several refugee respondents chose to offer voluntary services rather than remaining inactive in the camps. One Iranian refugee, who alternated between volunteering in his camp and earning money as an interpreter and tattoo artist, expressed: "I don't want to sit here and do nothing. I've been working even with volunteering. I just want to do something." This sentiment was communicated in many interviews with refugees. Of the 38 refugees asked about their current employment status, eight (21%) reported that they regularly engaged in one or more volunteer positions.

One 20 year old Afghan refugee estimated that he spent 10 hours per day volunteering. He said:

As far as I can do here, I'm trying to be helpful. Helping with the refugees going to the kitchen, preparing foods, help refugees like going to the hospitals interpreting for patients and help them. I go to reports, there is a camp. I help with the food distribution, clothes distribution, I just wanted to be useful. This is life, everybody came here, they risked their lives to start a good life, to work on their future, to have a bright future, but not here because Greece is not a country so that they could make their dreams come true because Greece is dealing with the economic crisis and many other problems and nobody likes to stay here indefinitely.

Table 1: Employment Status of Refugee Respondents

None	26
Volunteering	8
Temporary Positions	3
Stable Employment	1

⁸All names have been changed or removed to ensure respondent anonymity and safety.

The lack of employment opportunities in Greece was cited as the main reason for people wanting to leave the country. The Iranian respondent continued, "I need money. Greece is not a good place for making money and everyone knows. I didn't plan on staying unless there's some opportunities that I can make money." Although most refugees expressed that they preferred to leave Greece in order to pursue employment elsewhere in Europe, their daily reality involves waiting in Greece for many months until they receive a verdict on their asylum application. EU Council Directive 2003/9/EC gives asylum applicants the legal right to work, but even with official asylum applicant status, refugees are unable to secure jobs that are compatible with their skills due to the financial conditions in Greece.

Compared with other groups of migrants, refugees are generally more highly educated (OECD, 2015). However, Greece's financial crisis exacerbates the problem of refugee unemployment. Even before the current refugee influx, 35% of highly educated male immigrants and 44% of highly educated female immigrants were unemployed in Greece (MIPEX, 2015). Although three refugees in this study reported temporary employment experiences as interpreters for non-governmental organizations, most (66%) of dual-language refugee respondents could not find work at all. This underemployment represents a lost opportunity for both migrants and the Greek economy. Instead of using their skills to contribute to the Greek economy, many refugees find that often the only available jobs are informal and illegal. One service provider who works to match refugees with employment opportunities explains:

There are some jobs here, but most of them are on the black market. Because many of the migrants don't have the documents, they work in restaurants, on the fields—hard jobs. Cleaners, farmers. We are trying not to find them jobs on the black market, but sometimes it's the only way for them to earn a living and live their life here in Greece.

An Afghan refugee summarized his employment prospects in Greece as follows:

People who are musicians, doctors, teachers, headmasters.. They don't have space in the society. [...] When I came here to Greece, as a musician, I had a very big hope, but this hope of mine died. That's why I am more disappointed than before. Thinking that when you are coming, you

don't have any friends, there is no government support or financial support. So it is very hard to manage to live here. We can be smugglers, we can people who use drugs or sell drugs. What do you think? What can be the future for us? This is Greece.

The last resort of black market employment is not ideal because the state cannot collect income tax on this type of employment, it encourages crimes such as drug dealing and smuggling, and it drastically heightens refugees' vulnerability to exploitation. One service provider in a day center for Afghan youth shared that many of the teens that frequent the center have felt compelled to prostitute themselves in order to make money. Although refugees may have been professionals in various fields before migrating to Greece, the lack of legal employment opportunities has posed a significant barrier to their integration in Greece.

Refugees bring not only skills and education, but they are also positively predisposed to seek solutions. As people who risked their lives to find a better life, refugees possess high levels of initiative and resilience. Passive dependence on humanitarian aid is not only frustrating, but a waste of their talent and energy. The co-founder of a day center in the city explained:

We get to interact with so many people on a daily basis who are so eager to have a sense of belonging, to find a place to live and to start being active. They don't want to be parasites, they don't want to be 'dealt with' as parasites. [...] They can make things work for themselves and for others. I actually think that this kind of energy that they bring is not only inspiring for all of us, but it's also something that can create solutions in dying economies. Not only in terms of financial benefit, but also in terms of the ethos that they bring. They are people who are really willing to work hard to make a life. If you just marginalize them, and create this kind of passive recipient culture, then I think that this is going to create bigger problems and bigger challenges. We have to also think about the dynamic of this movement, what drives this journey, the motivation, the energy that all these people bring into our society.

One of the dangers of barring refugees' access to employment is the danger of creating self-contained

⁹Although the term "ghetto" has historically been used to describe ethnic segregation of Jews or African-Americans, I use the term to describe a particular state-effected organization of refugee populations into segregated physical areas, such as refugee camps. This containment of populations produces decay and disorder, which are then used by the state as further reasons to segregate the population (Duneier, 2016).

ghettos in which refugees are not given the opportunity to financially contribute to the Greek economy.⁹ One service provider who has worked with migrants since before the current refugee influx expressed the following sentiment:

These people are not animals. You cannot have them sitting there without doing anything. Employment should be considered for them as well as it is not logical, productive, or healthy to have them sitting and doing nothing. This infuriates them as well. The danger of creating cities within the cities is born. They will start practicing professions within the camps and creating a whole new city there. It is more safe to give the option to a barber or to a teacher to work outside. With some attempts we can surpass any differences we have with them.

The challenge facing government and non-governmental service providers, then, is to seek to minimize illegal and informal economic activity, harness the skills and energy of refugees, and expand the Greek economy by creating opportunities for gainful employment.

II. Housing

Housing conditions for refugees in Athens vary widely, from subsidized private apartments to tents in camps. The UNHCR reports that 1,818 apartments are immediately available for refugee tenants in the country, while there are 55 hotel rooms and 45 host families (UNHCR, 2017b). Those who cannot live in independent housing or housing provided by non-governmental organizations generally reside in refugee camps or squats. An estimated 38,000 refugees reside in official refugee camps in Athens operated by the UNHCR, the Athens municipality, or the Greek military (Baker, 2016). Most of these camps are on the fringes of the city, and conditions within the camps vary considerably. Camp residents are provided with basic meals and medical care by volunteers, non-governmental organizations, or the military. Some refugees also lived in unofficial camps, which generally lack security and government presence. After the EU-Turkey deal in March 2016, refugees arriving to the Greek islands were detained on the island until their case could be processed. However, many refugees smuggled themselves to Athens and did not subsequently register for official camp accommodation for fear of deportation. Due to their lack of official

documentation, many refugees in this situation chose to stay in tents in informal camps at Athens' Piraeus Port or in the abandoned Elliniko airport. Though the camp at Piraeus Port was evacuated in July 2016, an estimated 3,000 refugees still reside in the abandoned airport (Nallu, 2016).

Another 1,500 refugees live in squats, or occupied, abandoned buildings in the city of Athens. These squats are organized by Greek anarchists and anti-fascists who eschew NGO support and instead hold weekly assemblies for refugees to decide how to self-govern the squats. In addition to encouraging refugees to self-organize chore rotations and language lessons, anarchists have also partnered with refugees to organize protests against closed borders and inadequate refugee accommodations in Athens.

Of the refugee respondents I interviewed, 17 (42.5%) lived in camps, 13 (32.5%) in squats, six (15%) in temporary housing such as a friend's apartment, and four (10%) had stable housing. Like with the issue of employment, refugees often tied their housing status to their feelings of dignity. In general, refugees living in temporary or stable apartments did not express frustration with their accommodation. Of the refugees living together in squats and camps, those in camps felt more isolated. Seven (50%) of 14 refugee respondents living in camps reported having no social connections in Greece, even with co-ethnic refugees. In contrast, only three (18.8%) of 16 respondents in squats reported having no social connections whatsoever.

Refugees living in camps expressed strong feelings of isolation, frustration, and resentment towards Greece than others. One refugee shared, "I am feeling like I am not a human being ... I stay in a tent. I didn't expect to stay in a tent." Outdoor camps were anecdotally associated with ethnic tensions and competition between different national groups for humanitarian services. One camp resident shared:

Every day they are fighting because of [the] bad situation. They're all mad. They got crazy like these days especially in this hot weather. They're fighting with each other like Syrian, Afghan, Pakistan people. They mess up things a lot. They didn't like each other just because of the situation. They're stressed.

A humanitarian worker in this same camp also noted the interethnic tensions and the concerning lack of co-ethnic social networks. She believed that the camp environment aggravated these tensions because residents are kept in a "dependency mindset." All meals, goods, and services are provided by humanitarian orga-

Table 2: Social Networks and Housing status of refugee respondents

Housing	Social Networks				Total
	None	Co-ethnic	Volunteer	Greek friends	
Camp	7	1	4	2	14
Squat	3	7	4	2	16
Temp	1	1	3	3	8
Stable	0	1	0	3	4
Total	11	10	11	10	

nizations; when refugees are reduced to passive recipients, they may feel that they must compete for limited handouts.

This sentiment is generally not reflected in the squatted buildings. Refugees living in squats expressed positive views towards Greeks. One squat resident responded:

[The squats are] so welcoming. There is no difference between people. But in the camps they definitely hate Greeks. Most of them [hate Greeks] because Greeks running the navy and military services are not really welcoming, so they don't like those people, and they think the whole country is like that. They're going to keep thinking that the people are like this. Without knowing anyone. But when people are living in squat and being in contact with Greek people, Spanish people, any other, they will learn how they should be around some Spanish or Greek, or anyone from other countries because they will get to know the culture from that country.

In the self-organized squats, a spirit of solidarity seemed to be shared by most residents, even across ethnic differences. One Syrian woman stated, "We love each other. Even with the Afghans, we have very close relationships with each other. We share the same pain and we took the same journey, so we have the same spirit. We all suffered in the same war."

Even in the squats, though, residents often expressed discomfort at the instability of their housing situation. This feeling of insecurity is not unwarranted. In August 2016, one refugee squat in Athens was attacked by arsonists using Molotov cocktails and gas-bottle bombs (Holman, 2016). In July 2016 and March 2017, Greek police conducted raids on squats in Thessaloniki and Athens, arresting or forcibly evicting residents. Respondents in camps and squats often wished for the consistency and security of private accommodation. One Syrian male living in a squat said:

The main thing is a minimal kind of place to live because the thing that we came here for is security. So we are fleeing a war and the minimal condition is that we need to feel safe. Is a place where we know we can stay there. We wouldn't be evicted the next day. That we can remain in at a minimal level of safety.

In addition to providing security and stability, private accommodation is also more likely to encourage refugee integration. Losi and Strang (2008) find refugees in private housing are more likely to achieve integration outcomes than those residing in group housing or hostels. Athens also has an ideal layout for facilitating refugee integration. Real estate prices in most European cities are most expensive in the city centers, thereby relegating migrants and low-income families to ghettos on the fringes of the city. However, real estate prices in Athens are largely determined by the specific floors within each building, with basement floors costing significantly less than upper floors. Pavlou and Christopoulou (2008) suggest that this design prevents ghettoization by class or race. Since the start of the financial crisis, an estimated 30% of apartments in Athens lie vacant while landlords are still obligated to pay property taxes.

Some organizations, including Solidarity Now, the UNHCR, the Athens municipality, and Praksis are already implementing subsidized apartment accommodation schemes, prioritizing the most vulnerable refugee families first. This arrangement provides income for Greek landlords while also improving the security and integration prospects of refugees.

III. Education

According to the EU Council Directive 2003/9/EC, all children, regardless of legal status in Greece, have the right to receive education in Greece. However, of the estimated 10,000 refugee children in Greece, only around 2,000 have been offered formal educational services (Baboulias, 2017). Currently, refugee children attend

an after-hours program in the Greek schools until they have acquired sufficient language skills to integrate into the Greek education system.

Of the 25 refugee respondents with children, 19 (76%) reported that their child was not involved in any sort of educational program. Four (16%) reported that their child was regularly attending informal classes run by NGOs or volunteers, and two (8%) had children enrolled in the Greek school system. Two other adult refugees who had been in Greece for 7 or more years had received higher education in Greece previously.

While spaces in the Greek school system are prohibitively limited for refugee children, some parents stated that they would not enroll their child in Greek school even if given the opportunity. Many refugees hope to leave Greece and seek education for their children in their destination country rather than in Greece. One mother withdrew her daughter from Greek school because she did not want her children to learn Greek or integrate, as she hoped to eventually move on to Germany.

Informal classes for children are taught in every squat and camp included in this study. Although these classes are often led by volunteers with no prior teaching background, instructors recognized the benefits of providing skills, structure, and discipline for the children in the camps. One volunteer teacher shared:

As far as my sector is concerned, I feel that the need for an educational environment is of top priority. The thirst for books, pens, and to learn is indescribable. They nearly beg you to teach them English and Greek words. They have been deprived of the security, familiarity, limits of a classroom, and maternal figure of a teacher that the school environment offers. One notices that this results to them misbehaving.

Participation in these informal classes is likely to better prepare children for the behavioral and academic expectations of formal schooling. However, these informal classes are not ideal for several reasons. First, teachers in the camps and squats are not following a state-accredited curriculum, and volunteer turnover is high. This lack of continuity may possibly contribute to children's behavioral and emotional challenges. One volunteer with a schooling project in an outdoor camp described how the foreign team who created the project had returned home, leaving the schooling project in the hands of young, inexperienced volunteers. In response, the children of the camp repeatedly vandalized the classroom and threatened volunteers. The volunteer shared:

Psychologically I imagine the children feel abandoned by something that had been a rare constant in their lives since arriving at the [camp]. The [school project] gave them the means to be vulnerable, to be kids, it also gave them the means to be hurt, to be abandoned. I know the founders were trying to contribute, but part of me questions why they created their own organization instead of joining forces with one of the many already existing organizations who could have provided proper overview of the situation.

Even when volunteers do not abandon schooling projects, they often shared feelings of fatigue and pessimism that their efforts are still necessary after so many months. Another volunteer teacher expressed:

All of the volunteers are already tired, and we feel limited. We ask for help—training, for example—or even to be informed regarding what will have in the future with the education of the refugees. Sadly no one cares to do so. We insist to continue this basic activities because we know that if we leave no one will give this basic support to these children.

Integrating children into the formal school system is not only a legal right of refugee children, but may be a positive driver of integration for both the younger and older generations of refugees in Greece. Two Greek teachers individually observed that children's education has a "multiplier effect" on the integration of migrant families. When children need to understand Greek to succeed in school, the teachers noticed that migrant mothers are then more likely to pursue Greek language learning in order to assist their children with homework. Schools also serve as a point of social connection for both children and parents, which can help them develop bonds with Greek citizens.

Fortunately, Greece already has several structures in place to assist with integrating refugee children into the state education system. Recent data shows that the student-teacher ratio in Greece is remarkably low, with an average of 9.2 students for every Greek teacher (UNESCO, 2012). In 1996, Greece also instituted 13 "intercultural" schools around the country, which are specifically designed to introduce migrant students to Greece's language and culture in addition to teaching them the state school curriculum. These schools provide intensive "reception courses" for migrant students alongside their regular schoolwork in order to teach vital integration skills (Tsaliki, 2016). However, the three intercultural

schools in Athens may run the risk of overly concentrating refugee children instead of spreading them evenly across the city's schools. If refugee children are not regularly interacting with Greek children, opportunities for integration decrease.

Another barrier to educational integration of refugee children in Greece is the xenophobic attitudes of some parents. In October 2016, 1,500 refugee children were transported to local schools for their first day of formal classes in Greece. While many schools welcomed the children with songs and applause on their first day in Greek school, parents in one school padlocked the school gate to bar entrance to refugee pupils (Squires, 2016). Although enrolling refugee children in Greek school will likely yield positive integration results, policymakers are faced with strains on resources and anti-refugee attitudes.

IV. Health

Obtaining quality healthcare is a significant challenge for many refugees in Athens. Even before the financial crisis or migration influx, Greek law barred access to healthcare for many migrants. L. 4251/2014 of Greece's Immigration Code states that healthcare providers can face legal repercussions for treating undocumented migrants in non-emergency situations. While documented asylum seekers face fewer barriers to the healthcare system than undocumented migrants, Greece is ranked #32 out of 38 European countries for migrants' access to healthcare due to limited services and high out-of-pocket payments (MIPEX, 2015).

Of the refugees interviewed in this study, many were determined to leave Greece in order to seek necessary healthcare or surgical operations elsewhere in the European Union. Medical professionals in Greece were divided on their willingness to provide healthcare services to refugees. One non-governmental worker observed:

Some people and some services are really helpful. Some of us don't. I have seen doctors who said, 'I wouldn't examine this one because he's a refugee. I can't understand his language. I don't need a translator, and go away. I have seen doctors that examine without a translator, without asking for money, without asking for anything. Yes, both.

In another example, one translator often accompanied a refugee patient to a doctor who was treating the patient's stage-4 breast cancer with free chemotherapy. Refugee women are also permitted to give birth

in Greek hospitals, but the resources for prenatal and postnatal care are largely provided in the camps by humanitarian organizations.

Humanitarian organizations and volunteers provide the majority of non-emergency services for refugees interviewed in this study. One day-center included a dentistry clinic operated by volunteer dentists. Another organization addressed the psychological needs of refugees in camps through offering counseling services. In fact, many service providers considered mental and emotional trauma the most pressing health issue for refugees in Greece. One refugee mother shared, "Even when I arrived to Greece, I was feeling that a rocket will hit us. I was always looking at the sky wondering where will the rocket come from, even when the airplane was in the sky for filming, I was afraid."

Refugees have experienced trauma not only from violence in their home countries, but also on their journeys to Greece and in Greece itself. Some service providers worried that refugees' trauma would intensify when they realized that they would not be able to relocate outside of Greece. For example, one professional expressed this view:

What we have heard from there is that while they are in Greece, for example, they are still in a flight mode situation which means mentally they are still like, '[...] I have to get on, to move on, move on, move on, move on.' [...] They are in this kind of mode, and then when [...] everything is okay and they get the papers, then they have this reaction of all the traumas that they have. They are sometimes the traumas that they have experienced in Greece. Having a difficult journey to enter the country in a boat filled with 50 people. They might have seen people drowned next to them, surviving that, being on a camp, being in a terrible condition surviving that, coming to Athens, living in a park, being exploited by grown up men or starving or all kinds of situations.

Many refugees in Greece will likely be dealing with long-term trauma, and access to mental health services may be critical to their successful integration into Athens. However, providing these services is extremely challenging, especially considering that even Greeks have faced extremely limited access to health care due to the financial crisis.

Table 3: Language Acquisition of Refugee Respondents

	Learning	Achieved fluency while in Greece	Prior knowledge	Total
English	10	1	5	16
Greek	3	3	0	6
None	.	.	.	19
Total	13	4	5	

V. Language

Throughout this study, language was continually emphasized as one of the most critical skills needed for refugee integration. Losi and Strang (2008) find that earlier access to language courses is correlated with higher levels of integration among refugees in their host communities. Many respondents emphasized that language is an essential means to achieving most other aspects of integration. In the view of both refugees and service provider respondents, language is essential for accessing social services, finding employment, making local connections, and interacting successfully within Greece.

Of the 38 refugee respondents who discussed language learning, 19 (50%) had not attempted to learn Greek or English, either due to a lack of interest or a lack of available language classes. Of the 13 respondents who were actively pursuing language learning while in Greece, ten (77%) preferred to learn English rather than Greek. This preference is most likely a reflection of most respondents' desire to leave Greece and travel elsewhere within Europe, where English would be more useful to them than Greek.

Many refugees found English skills useful for their time in Greece as well. According to the Eurobarometer survey, 46% of Greeks are able to communicate in English (European Commission, 2012). As such, English is a beneficial skill for refugees regardless of their final asylum country. Additionally, many refugees regularly interact with foreign volunteers and humanitarian workers, the majority of whom communicate primarily in English. Service providers at three day centers reported that their beginner and advanced English classes were regularly overbooked, with a waiting list of more refugees seeking to learn the language. Anecdotally, I spoke with several refugees who had learned enough English in Greece to communicate successfully with me in conversations and interviews. This ability to communicate in English also became a means of agency and advocacy for refugees. The co-founder of one organization shared:

One of the things we really emphasize here is the contact they have with re-

searchers, academics, media. We try to really promote their advocacy, to strengthen their expression, and let them define what's important for them. [...] Because communication is something that, when you're an outsider, and you feel marginalized, it's a great challenge. So we try to deal with it from the very first moment and give them as many tools, as much confidence as we can so that they can directly engage with the wider public. We believe in it. We believe that the genuine voice of someone, if you get to know the face, the stories, behind each refugee number, then you cannot help but feel empathy with what they're facing.

This drive for English language acquisition is a notable finding. While many refugees are unwilling to learn Greek as long as they harbor the hope of moving elsewhere in Europe, they may be motivated to learn English, which can empower them to integrate in Greece or in another European country.

Language instruction is also a sensible investment, as it has a no-cost multiplying effect. Refugees who learn English or Greek are more likely to teach the language to their children or fellow refugees. One Afghan respondent who learned English through volunteering in his camp was denied permission to start his own English class in the camp, so every night he opens his tent to 12 refugees to informally teach them the language as well.

In addition to imparting their language skills to fellow refugees, language learners are also more likely to be an asset to the government and non-governmental organizations who are managing the refugee influx because they can serve as interpreters and cultural mediators. For example, by employing just one bilingual refugee, the Greek asylum service could better manage the Skype appointment system by expanding its weekly window for speakers of other languages to call and make their appointments.

In the long-term, Greek language acquisition will also be critical for complete integration and acceptance

into Greek society. Children must speak Greek to integrate fully into the school system, and several Afghan business owners who have been in Greece for over seven years relayed the importance of knowing Greek. One such business owner reported, "When Greeks hear me speak, with my skin but with my accent, they are surprised. They say, 'Oh, you're ours.'"

VI. Social Networks

Refugees' social networks in Athens appear to be strongly tied to refugees' language skills and accommodation situation. Many respondents' general feelings towards Greeks seem to be dictated by their satisfaction with their accommodation situation. Additionally, social connections with "older" migrant networks were reported to be highly beneficial for recently arrived refugees.

Of the 35 refugee respondents who discussed social networks in Greece, 11 (31%) reported having no social connections at all. Only four respondents (11%) reported that their social group was limited to co-ethnics only. The majority of respondents (58%) stated that in addition to co-ethnic refugee friends, they had also made social connections with foreign volunteers and local Greeks. Language skills seem to be the factor most strongly associated with the development of social networks. Of the 12 respondents who reported having no social network whatsoever, ten (83%) did not speak English or Greek and were not actively learning either language. While language is not strongly associated with the development of co-ethnic social networks, refugees learning a language are more likely to have friendships with volunteers and Greeks.

As previously discussed, it seems that refugees' social networks are also directly related to their accommodation. Refugees in camps are the most likely to report having no social connections whatsoever, even with co-ethnic refugees. Seven (58%) of the 12 respondents

reporting no social connections resided in a refugee camp. The only two camp-dwelling refugees who reported having Greek friends were notably proactive about leaving the camp to spend the day in the city and volunteering with humanitarian organizations.

In the housing section of this analysis, it was noted that camps often lead to feelings of resentment towards Greeks. When asked whether she had made any local friends, one female refugee living in a camp responded, "What, do you think we will find friends here in this prison?" A volunteer noticed this resentment as well, saying:

Although I met some lovely refugees, I sadly felt a bit unsettled at times with some of the refugees. While understanding completely that these people are pushed to their edge and are living in awful conditions, there were a few moments where I was scared, unsettled at some of the people's hatred towards the volunteers, other religions and Greek country in general- and no matter how many time we got translators to explain that these volunteers were not paid to do this, and that Greece itself was also in an economic crisis.

Some volunteers also noted that informal refugee camps and settlements are more likely to create feelings of resentment towards refugees among local Greeks:

Every day we see more and more changes, from Athens being filled with refugees on the streets, robberies, the camps in Piraeus port and Elliniko [airport camp] for example, being trashed and the biggest concern I've heard, the beaches. Greeks wonder why Greece has to take responsibility for this crisis, when they already have their own.

Despite the tendency of camps to breed feelings of distrust and resentment, some volunteers believed that

Table 4: *Social Networks and Language Acquisition of Refugee Respondents*

Language	Social Networks				Total
	No social	Co-ethnics	Volunteers	Greeks	
No language	10	3	1	2	16
English-learning	2	2	6	1	11
English-learned	2	2	6	1	11
English-prior	0	3	3	3	9
Greek-learning	0	0	3	1	4
Greek-learned	0	1	0	3	4
Total	12	11	13	12	

Table 5: Social Networks and Accommodation Status of Refugee Respondents

Accommodation	Social Networks				Total
	No social	Co-ethnics	Volunteers	Greeks	
Camp	7	1	4	2	14
Squat	3	7	4	2	16
Temp	1	1	3	3	8
Stable	0	1	0	3	4
Total	11	10	11	10	

the government prefers to keep people in camps in order to discourage social interaction between refugees and Greeks. One service provider commented:

I think that the government doesn't really care about integration. They prefer to have refugees outside the society, because they don't want to mess with local people. The local people are really angry because we have economic crisis, and many of them see refugees as threats. The Greek state doesn't want to mess with local societies.

While the current government is leftist, many Greek respondents mentioned the government's wariness of the far-right Golden Dawn party.

Then you have people that are really against refugees. Most of the time it's part of the Golden Dawn Party [...] because they consider all of these people on the move being Muslims and they're afraid of this radicalization or they believe that migrants and refugees might end up just staying here and taking over the job market.

Although the Golden Dawn party represents only 7% of the Greek population (Nardelli, 2015), this wariness is not unwarranted. As previously discussed, one refugee squat in the anarchist neighborhood of Exarcheia was attacked with Molotov cocktails and gas bombs (Holman, 2016). This incident was one in a chain of anti-migrant attacks in 2016.

However, on the other side of the political spectrum, Greece's leftists and anarchists have not only demonstrated strong support for refugees, but they have included refugees in political festivals, protests, and demonstrations. During the summer fieldwork 2016, the anti-discrimination movement hosted its annual three-day festival at the University of Athens with the theme "Refugees Welcome." This movement not only facilitates social connections between Greeks and refugees, but it also provides refugees with political agency in the host community.

Many refugees expressed the significance of their social connections with volunteers and humanitarian workers. These connections with non-refugees increased their feelings of dignity and goodwill towards Greeks. One refugee woman shared, "I feel like I'm blessed here. Although I'm a refugee, and refugee is a humiliating thing, I met nice people here and I have lots of friends. I'm enjoying my time actually."

Another dimension of social networks is the relationship between "older" migrants and the new arrivals. Many refugees and migrants who arrived in Greece before the current influx refer to themselves as the "older generation" of migrants and seek to mentor new arrivals on the integration process. Losi and Strang (2008) find a strong correlation between mentor projects and refugee integration, both in employment and personal spheres. In Athens, this mentorship occurs both formally and informally. One network of "older" female migrants from many countries created a non-governmental organization to respond to incoming female refugees in Athens. A co-founder of this organization realized the supportive nature of migrant networks, commenting:

[Women's networks] could organize overnight, there was a cooperative spirit that was lacking from the rest of society you would find in them, and their action did not depend on their formal status, but sometimes you could see that their informal networks were more effective, [...] more active, delivering more results. So it didn't depend on whether they had the status or formal status, so it would just be informal networks that would mobilize in order to support each other.

The director of a home for male refugee youth also recognized the importance of refugee social connections with older refugees who have successfully integrated. He gave the following example:

Atif, who's now about to cook and with the boys, he's been here for years and speaks Greek and can provide his [perspective] a

little bit. He has a family and children going to school here and he can be a little bit like, 'It can be done. We can integrate and be a part of the society and actually have a future.' He has his own business, for example.

Among the benefits of social networks, respondents often cited the breakdown of xenophobia, the increase of dignity, and the creation of positive feelings between refugees and Greeks. Because social networks appear to be strongly related to language development and accommodation options, policymakers may consider how housing and language programs might yield positive social results as well.

VII. Cultural Knowledge

Although refugees generally claimed not to know very much about Greek culture, Syrian and Greek respondents often drew comparisons between their cultural customs and mannerisms. However, despite appreciating certain cultural affinities, refugees still expressed wariness of the Greek financial crisis, while some Greeks distrusted Islam. To overcome these barriers, some service providers appealed to Greece's own refugee past.¹⁰

While most refugees do not know much about Greek history or cultural practices, most seem well informed of the financial crisis and perceive a complete lack of economic opportunities in Greece. However, Syrians in particular generally experience cultural affinity with Greeks. In the words of one Syrian, "Syrians are not really far, it's all Mediterranean people. Mentality-wise, Syrians are not really far from Greeks. I don't think they would have problems." In fact, several Syrian refugee respondents indicated that they would prefer asylum status in Greece to asylum in an Arab country. One Syrian respondent emphasized that he would never want to be resettled in the Gulf region, stating, "They hate the Syrians [...] I don't like the people there. I don't like their life. They're very, very strict, very strict I think."

Despite the Syrian affinity with Greeks, most Syrians also know enough of Greece's financial situation to prefer settlement elsewhere in Europe. In the words of one Syrian male, "The Greeks are so good with us but even the Greeks there is nothing they can do. As you know, they have a crisis of their own, so there is nothing they can do." Another female refugee stressed that she did not want the Greek government to expend extra resources for refugees. She said:

I know that Greece is a poor country and there's a lot of pressure in Greece already and they don't—Greece doesn't have any possibility to really help us. I understand that. Everything you have done so far has been great. The one thing they can do is open the borders. That would be the thing that they could do.

Both Greeks and Syrians are quick to draw comparisons between cultures. For example, during Eid celebrations in one of the squats, I overheard one refugee explaining to a Greek volunteer, "Eid is our Easter." In return, Greeks also perceive similarities with Syrian culture. One service provider explained:

We're similar, and the countries are similar. I have seen photos from Syria before the war. It's like Greece. It has mountains and seas, like here. They work, but not all day. They have fun like us. Okay, they don't eat pork, but...

Another service provider highlighted the difference between Syrian refugees and refugees of other nationalities by explaining how Syrians and Greeks make similar jokes and have the same style of humor.

This cultural affinity between Greek and Syrian respondents generally did not extend to Afghan refugees. While Greek respondents still expressed sympathy for Afghan refugees, most did not feel culturally similar to Afghans. One Greek service provider believed that the media exacerbated Greek suspicion towards Afghans, saying:

The media says [...] Afghan people, they're more war-friendly and they're more violent. The middle Greek person who sits in his house and watches TV believes that. There's an opinion in the community that some Afghans or from Morocco, black people, of course. It's racist but there's an opinion like that.

Although many Greek respondents in this study expressed empathy for refugees and noticed cultural similarities with Syrians, some respondents felt wary of Islam. An estimated 98% of Greek citizens religiously identify as Greek orthodox (US Department of State, 2011). There are no mosques in Athens, and plans to construct one have been the subject of fierce political

¹⁰In the early twentieth century, over 200,000 Greek Orthodox inhabitants of Asia Minor were persecuted and forcibly driven out by Turks in the Ottoman Empire (BjÄyrlund, 2008). Though this persecution formally ended with Greece's defeat in the Greco-Turkish war in 1922, many Greek respondents in this study still appealed to the collective memory of their refugee past.

debate. Even volunteers who otherwise felt very sympathetic towards refugees expressed uneasiness with Islam. One volunteer commented:

There are certain elements that put me in a difficult position such as their obsession with the Sharia and religion and their attitude towards women. They have however, expressed their hospitality by inviting us for tea, giving us food, or giving us little gifts. My opinion is that if you ignore the stereotypical ideas towards their religion you will notice that they are rather kind and discrete people.

One service provider theorized that this distrust of Islam may stem from the history of the Ottoman empire's historical rule in Greece. However, it is also possible that Greek sympathy towards refugees has historical roots as well. One service provider suggested:

The people that have really shown solidarity are people that empathize with the people on the move due to the fact they have been refugees or their parents have been refugees, because there are a lot of people in Greece that came from Asia Minor. They have gone through this process themselves or have parents or grandparents that have and can understand what these people are going through and how they feel and how difficult it is for them.

Some non-governmental organizations have seen Greeks' refugee past as a means to generating more support for refugees. In the words of one service provider:

We try to organize events around the municipalities that have the refugee history themselves and really tap on that collective memory: that idea that we were refugees in the past, we've been refugees ourselves, we have migrants in our families, we have a huge diaspora everywhere and to welcome the other the way we've been welcomed by others.

In general, Greek respondents appeared optimistic and open to the idea of refugee integration. One service provider shared his view, saying:

With some attempts we can surpass any differences we have with them. They came from a long way and are very tired themselves; they didn't come with guns here to take over. Of course some are dangerous but this holds for Greeks as well.

VIII. Ability to navigate the city

When asked about navigating the city, many refugee participants responded by describing their difficulty visiting the Greek asylum office on Katehaki Street. In fact, "visiting Katehaki" was a common expression to describe the stages of the asylum application process. The conversations with refugees often then turned to their difficulty in accessing official information about the asylum process and the services available to them. False rumors, misinformation from volunteers, and a lack of clarity were frequently cited as a cause for frustration and tension during our fieldwork in summer 2016. By the winter, it seemed as though refugees felt more confident in their information about the asylum application process. This access to information was perhaps the most significant change observed between the summer fieldwork and winter fieldwork in this study.

When discussing visiting the city and navigating Athens' various streets and neighborhoods, 23 of 29 respondents (79%) reported feeling comfortable navigating the city. While some organizations provided refugees with a public transport pass, this service was not universal. Some refugees staying at an unofficial camp expressed a reluctance to travel into the city after being heavily fined for not having a bus ticket.

However, service providers and refugees acknowledged that helping refugees navigate the city has numerous positive benefits. The primary benefit of empowering refugees to navigate the city is the acquisition of confidence and self-reliance. One service provider observed, "We tell them the way to do the things that they need in the city. At first they are afraid, next step they're doing it. After that, they are sure that they can do whatever they want." Another service provider noted that having refugees physically interacting with the city was essential for breaking down xenophobia and distrust:

It's like this woman from Afghanistan I met in July. We helped them getting around for a couple of months and in October they called us—they invite us to their house for a dinner. [...] If that woman with her hijab goes to a supermarket or a shop and people is like this at first place and she starts speaks Greek, it's the first step to break up the barrier.

Empowering refugees to navigate the city yields economic benefits to local businesses, increases refugees' self-reliance, and encourages a more widespread social acceptance of refugees in Athens as well.

IX. Willingness to stay in Greece

Finally, refugees' willingness to stay in Greece was analyzed as a final important factor in the integration process. Although over one million refugees passed through Greece in 2015 and 2016, only 11,000 (1%) applied to stay and receive asylum in Greece (Connor, 2016).

While only five out of 37 (13.5%) of refugee respondents answered that Greece is their ultimate destination country, 46% did admit that they would be willing to stay in Greece if they were not accepted for resettlement in a third country. Of those who would still not be willing to stay in Greece, some said that they would pay a smuggler to move elsewhere in Europe, return to Turkey, or even return home.

Table 6: *Refugees' Willingness to Stay in Greece*

	Would stay in Greece		Total
	No	Yes	
Afghan	0	8	8
Iranian	0	1	1
Palestinian-Syrian	1	0	1
Syrian	18	7	25
Total	17	15	
No children	9	14	23
With children	8	1	9
Total	17	15	

It became clear throughout the course of the fieldwork that refugees who were unwilling to stay in Greece expressed far less motivation to integrate into the city. However, one service provider explained how integration is still valuable, even for refugees who may eventually relocate outside of Greece:

They don't want [to integrate], because they have the hope that they will leave the country. They are a little negative. They don't have the motivation because they are closed into the camps and the shelters. They need the motivation to go out and learn more about the culture. I think they should, because being here, for six months, one year, it will be a part of their life.

As previously discussed, most refugees cited Greece's financial crisis and the inability to find employment as their primary reason for being unwilling

to stay in Greece. Germany was by far the most common destination country, which was partially due to the perceived abundance of employment and government benefits in the country. However, many people were also determined to leave Greece because they already have relatives in other European countries. Of the 18 refugees who listed Germany as their destination country, 11 (61%) already had family members living in Germany.

Other refugees did not have a specific destination country in mind, listing "anywhere but Greece" as their destination. In addition to the financial difficulties they perceived in Greece, some refugees saw their living conditions and lack of dignity as worse than the violence in their home country. One Syrian woman shared, "I will be back in Syria, it will be easier. It will be cheaper, you know. Because you will lose only your life. Now you lose everything, it's like to die but step-by-step."

It does not appear that those who are willing to stay in Greece are defined by a single factor. 88% of parents with children expressed a determination to leave Greece, while refugees without children were divided on their willingness to stay. One worker in a home for young refugee men commented that all his residents wanted to stay in Greece. The young men in the home were from Syria, Morocco, Afghanistan, Mali, the Gambia, and Albania. Perhaps this is because they are young men who do not need to provide for dependents, or perhaps because they found a positive, protective environment in which they are provided with essential services and Greek language lessons.

Notably, every Afghan in this study said that they would stay in Greece. Afghans do not qualify for legal relocation elsewhere in Europe, so it appears they are resigned to a future in Greece. However, this sentiment is not shared by Syrian refugees, not even those who have been rejected from the relocation program. All five Syrian respondents who were denied relocation still expressed unwillingness to stay in Greece. One of these respondents decided to re-apply to the relocation scheme, while the other four were considering being smuggled to their destination countries.

X. The limits of civil society and aid dependency

Before moving on to policy recommendations, I will discuss another significant theme that emerged in the field. Service providers and volunteers frequently discussed the problems that civil society faces in managing the refugee situation. Although bottom-up grassroots solidarity from Greek civil society and non-governmental organizations has been dynamic and well-

intentioned, ultimately government structure and long-term, thoughtful integration policy is necessary to effectively manage the refugee influx. In this section, I discuss the limitations of civil society's ability to manage the refugee influx and the danger of creating structures that rely on aid and refugee dependency.

From the start of the refugee influx, volunteers and humanitarian organizations mobilized quickly in order to address the immediate needs of refugees in Athens. Their compassion and timeliness provided direct relief to many recently arrived refugees. One volunteer explained how she became involved in helping refugees at Athens' port:

We had to do something about these people. We couldn't leave them outside. As volunteers we couldn't just leave babies, women, children, disabled, old people outside. We took the decision to put them inside the room we had, feed them and offer them a place to sleep and give them whatever we could. Gradually this 'camp' grew bigger and bigger and turned to the informal camp of 5,000.

While many volunteers felt that this ad hoc response was necessary in the short-term, they also expressed fatigue and frustration that after several months, no more adequate solution had been provided by the government. One volunteer shared:

Sometimes I feel that the number of volunteers is too small to accommodate the large numbers of children making me as if hit by a wave. It is exhausting both physically and psychologically. There are a lot of needs and our energy and endurance is limited [...] You probably find me tired and pessimistic right now. My team members also feel the same way. Many of them quit. Our role was supposed to be temporary, but now we are a group that covers their needs on a daily basis. At this point we would like to complain and react to the negligence of the officials.

Because many volunteers operated on limited personal budgets and time frames, the continuity of their services was also unreliable. Unlike elected officials, volunteers could not be held accountable for the success or failure of their initiatives. In one example, a group of volunteers established an educational organization that gradually deteriorated as the founders returned home. One observer of the project commented:

I know the [organization was] trying to contribute, but part of me questions why they created their own organization instead of joining forces with one of the many already existing organizations who could have provided proper overview of the situation. Unfortunately, it seems the different organizations are constantly competing, rather than cooperating. It's frustrating and sad to see the potential for collaborative and improved humanitarian aid thwarted by ego.

This observer raises two other important issues: the duplication of volunteer efforts and the competition for funding among organizations. Without a central coordinating body, services provided to refugees may be duplicated or inequitably distributed. In many cases, volunteers simply provided services to the most accessible refugees, while refugees in closed camps received no volunteer support. One pro bono lawyer described the barriers he faced in attempting to provide legal advice to different refugee groups:

We managed to do four information sessions at the [informal camp]. We later decided to go to [a military-run camp]. However, there is when everything got blocked. They asked us for permissions from the Ministry of Domestic Affairs. Even though we applied we never got an answer back. We tried to get in [a government-run camp], but we couldn't get in either. We never heard back from the ministry regarding our applications. [...] I am furious with this situation. We went through all this and we want to help more but we are not allowed to.

Perhaps the most problematic long-term effect of volunteers and aid organizations managing the refugee crisis is the reinforcement of dependency amongst refugees. One volunteer explained, "The opportunity for funding to large organizations grows in proportion to dependence, so in some ways it benefits the organizations to keep the beneficiaries dependent on the work of the organization." Not only is this structure financially unsustainable in the long-term, but it also has damaging mental effects on refugees. One Greek volunteer described the situation as follows:

The main problem is not our humanitarian issue and how we deal with it, it's what I call institutionalization of the refugees. The refugees are not sick people and humans are not made only to sleep, to eat and charge their mobile phones. [...] People are made

to be active and responsible for their lives at some degree. Cooking has a symbolical also dimension, that I am responsible for what feeds me, nurtures me.

Interestingly, the issue of cooking food was frequently used to illustrate the problems with how refugee camps cultivated dependency rather than agency. One service provider explained:

People hate the food. And they would hate it. It's not only a matter of quality of the ingredients and the style of cooking. It's also a matter of self-respect and dignity. You have to be able to select your food. I understand that it's important when they arrive, after they get out of the boat, it's important that they get a meal served, but after a couple of weeks, people ought to be able to prepare their own stuff.

In these interviews, food became a symbol for the dignity or humiliation refugees felt. One Syrian woman shared, "If you want to have food, you have to wait for hours to two o'clock to have food, and you have to stand on a line holding your plate until you will reach and to fill the plate. The rice—and if it's salty, it's not your problem." Reclaiming the ability to cook one's own food was a matter of pride for several refugees. Another Syrian woman described how she began to cook for herself again, saying, "No, we are cooking. We are not allowed to cook, but they surrendered [...] Everybody bought a little thing, the electric hotplate..."

These limitations to civil society's ability to manage the refugee influx are important to keep in mind when considering the policy recommendations in the following section. While the duties of service provision have largely fallen on volunteers and aid organizations, both the government and non-governmental organizations must be conscientious of the sustainability and long-term effects of their efforts.

VII. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The following section outlines a series of policy recommendations for the government and service-providing organizations. These recommendations, which aim to facilitate the temporary integration of refugees into Athens, are guided by the principles of mutual-benefit, sustainability, and empowerment.

Guiding Principles

Mutually-beneficial: Because integration is a two-way process involving both refugees and the host society,

these integration policy recommendations aim to benefit both the refugee population and local Greeks (Jacobsen & Landau, 2003). It is not only theoretically appropriate to consider the implications of integration policy on the host society; it is also politically and economically necessary. The Greek financial crisis has resulted in severe economic conditions for many local Greeks, and the policy recommendations in this paper not only aim to benefit refugees, but also to ease the impact of the refugee influx on the country.

Sustainable: As previously discussed, much de facto integration occurs informally, or is facilitated by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) with one-time funding grants for special projects. However, this paper aims to provide policy recommendations for the Athens municipality and NGOs to implement sustained programs designed to foster the short and medium-term integration of refugees in Athens. In contrast to traditional refugee integration policy, this paper discusses the prospect of temporary integration for asylum applicants who most likely aspire to leave Greece after a period of several months or even years. Despite the short-term aims of these policy recommendations, the municipal government and service providing organizations are encouraged to consider the sustainability and long-term impacts of their programs upon refugees and the host community.

Empowering: In many cases, these recommendations do not suggest specific programs, but rather encourage the government and service providers to set suitable conditions that will empower refugees to flourish independently. This principle is reflected in the words of the co-founder of a migrant network, who believes:

Integration is something that people will do themselves, and they will pursue it very actively for a very long time. The important thing is to try and create comforting and encouraging environments for them to be able to bring out the best qualities and start creating a strategy for the future.

This future-focus is valuable, even if refugees plan to eventually move away from Greece. The same respondent continued:

Now, we don't perceive integration as something that only addresses the Greek society. Because many of the people are interested in transit, [...] we still believe that it's still very important as the first point of entry that they find a comforting environment here where they felt they can relate

and this can be a bridge connecting them to wherever they want to go.

Even if refugees will ultimately relocate to another country, cultural adaptation is a practice that will be valuable to them as they resettle elsewhere. Learning how to develop new social networks, navigate a foreign city, and operate within an unfamiliar culture are all transferable skills that may be applied in their futures.

Based upon the findings from this research and using the above principles as a guiding framework, I propose the following goals and policies:

Goal 1: Encourage refugees to participate more fully in the political and social life of Greece by harnessing refugees' own expertise on migrant issues.

To the government:

1. *Consult with migrant networks in Athens on issues of refugee policy and service-provision in Athens.* Already, policymakers in Greece have made great strides in responding to the appeals of migrant organizations. Legislation regarding Greek citizenship for immigrants was passed in 2015, largely due to the pressures and requests of migrant networks. This responsiveness to migrant advocacy should extend to consulting refugees themselves about improvements to Greece's refugee policy. In the words of one service provider:

Policymakers should have better ears to the ground and form policies based on that. People themselves know what the solutions are and they can be active as long as they are given the opportunity to be active.

To service providers:

2. *Mobilize existing migrant networks to mentor new refugees in the integration process.* The true experts on integration are the "older" generation of migrants who have established themselves within Greek society. Most "older" migrants have successfully integrated despite Greece's previous lack of integration programs and asylum procedures. When possible, utilize the expertise and services of these migrants, particularly Syrians and Afghans, in assisting with integration programs and in defining the most pertinent needs of refugees.

Goal 2: Harness the social and economic benefits of dignified accommodation by integrating refugees into apartments in Athens' central neighborhoods.

Renting apartments [...] makes sense because you're part of the society. You'll go to buy your bread. You'll go out to walk in the streets. You'll go to the supermarket to take whatever you need for cooking. It's a movement that you're part of the society and you're not isolated somewhere.

– Greek volunteer

To the government:

3. *Prioritize subsidized refugee apartment rentals over camp accommodation when possible.* Instead of investing aid funding in iso-box (shipping container) housing units within refugee camps, use available funding to subsidize refugee apartment rentals. Currently, around 30% of privately owned apartments in Athens are vacant, and many landlords are struggling to meet their property tax obligations (Catholic Relief Services, 2016). Around 40% of Greeks stated in a Kapa Research poll that they would willingly hand over properties to the state to fulfill future payments (Kapa Research Centre, 2014). Subsidizing refugee apartment rentals will counteract the decay and plummeting property values of vacant Greek apartments whilst providing immediate shelter for refugees and income for landlords.
4. *Seek to distribute refugees across Greece's 325 municipalities.* Spreading refugees across the country will ease the costs of the influx on Greece's large cities and islands. A more equitable distribution of refugee families will also preempt the formation of ghettos, and individual schools will be better able to integrate refugee pupils.

To service providers:

5. *Prioritize subsidized refugee apartment rentals over camp accommodation when possible.* This recommendation is provided to both the government and service providers. In addition to the reasons cited above, encouraging independent refugee housing will prevent the development of a passive dependency mindset. Empowering refugees to rely on themselves for cooking, cleaning, and home maintenance is more economically sustainable for refugee organizations and will encourage the de facto integration of refugees into local neighborhoods.

6. *Expedite the settlement and integration of Afghan refugees.* While apartment accommodation is likely to benefit refugees of all nationalities, Afghan refugees will live more permanently in Greece than Syrians due to their ineligibility for relocation. Service providers and refugees themselves acknowledge that Afghans generally receive less humanitarian and government support, despite the reality that they are more likely to remain in Greece and pursue long-term integration.

Goal 3: Give refugees the tools to integrate in Greece or in their destination country by encouraging English language learning.

To the government:

7. *Subsidize Greek citizens to complete certifications for teaching English or Greek as a foreign language.* This policy has the dual effect of creating jobs for Greek citizens and critical skills for refugees. English language learning will engage both refugee learners who will relocate outside of Greece after several months and those who remain overly optimistic about their relocation prospects. Through language learning, Greeks and refugees will engage in intercultural exchange and mutual skill-building.

To service providers:

8. *Allocate available resources to meet the demand for English language courses.* This may be accomplished through channeling available volunteers to the classroom and by removing restrictions on allowing refugees to conduct their own classes within the camps. When selecting an English-teaching curriculum, opt for programs that emphasize practical, conversational language learning rather than grammar and syntax.

9. *When possible, hire refugees with requisite language skills to work as interpreters or service providers.* Currently, the backlog of refugee asylum applications is largely due to a shortage of dual language employees to process asylum requests. Refugees with dual language skills are not only assets to organizations seeking interpreters, but they are also valuable cultural mediators who better understand the background and beliefs of refugees from their countries. This knowledge, combined with language skills, will lead to a more efficient response to the refugee

influx. Additionally, positions with service providing organizations are currently staffed mainly by foreign workers, so hiring refugees to fill these positions will not be depriving local Greeks of employment.

Goal 4: Give refugees tools for self-sufficiency, economic contribution, and social integration within Greece.

To the government:

10. *Waive or subsidize public transport fees for asylum applicants.* The benefits of increasing refugee mobility will likely outstrip the costs to Athens' public transport system. Refugees with the ability to navigate the city are more likely to purchase goods from local business, develop social networks outside of refugee camps, acquire essential language skills, and adapt to the cultural norms of the city.

11. *Consider providing a special work permit to refugees who have completed a Greek language and culture course.* While EU Council Directive 2003/9/EC guarantees asylum applicants access to the labor market, policy makers should consider developing a special distinction for refugees who actively seek to learn about Greek language and culture. This type of distinction will incentivize refugees to integrate more fully into Greece and will signal to local Greeks that refugees are attempting to positively engage with the host society.

To service providers:

12. *Establish communal kitchens within refugee camps and settlements.* As discussed previously, the ability to cook for oneself is essential for refugees' dignity and agency. One volunteer commented:

One of the other squats organized a schedule to cook for themselves. Three nights a week, the Syrians will cook for everybody. Other three nights a week, the Afghans will cook for everybody. People told us that they really liked doing it themselves too.

In addition to breaking down intercultural barriers, allowing refugees to cook for themselves is cost-saving as well. Currently, many camps cater three meals a day for residents, many of whom

already choose to forgo camp food and cook for themselves. This waste of food and resources could be easily mitigated by allowing residents to access communal kitchens.

13. *Provide prepaid cards or grocery vouchers rather than catering meals within refugee camps.* Another strategy for reducing superfluous costs and food waste in refugee camps is to reallocate food budgets to prepaid grocery vouchers. Several organizations in Athens are already adopting this approach, which support local businesses and increases refugees' purchasing power, consumption, and integration within the formal economy.

VIII. CONCLUSION

The mass influx of refugees into Greece has presented significant financial, logistical, and political challenges to both Greece and the European Union. Until the European Union implements a unified, long-term response to sustainably manage the incoming refugee population, there are still ways in which the Greek government and local service providers could improve their provisional refugee policies to facilitate the self-reliance and integration of refugees.

Guided by the insights of refugees and workers on the ground, the recommendations in this paper may provide a valuable starting place for improved refugee policy. These recommendations are designed with a specific context in mind based on fieldwork in Greece in 2016, but the dynamics of the refugee situation are ever-shifting. These changing circumstances may render the above policy recommendations unfeasible, but they also present opportunities for future academic research. For example, once all pending asylum and relocation applications have been decided, it will be interesting to note whether some refugees are more amenable to staying in Greece over the long-term. Other areas for future research could include the development and longevity of informal settlements such as squats, or the ways in which local businesses have adapted their services to cater to new refugee clientele.

The appropriate policy response to the refugee situation in Greece will also evolve over time. While policies to promote temporary refugee integration appear to be the most suitable in the current context, perhaps a more long-term paradigm will be needed again once refugees receive the results on their asylum applications. In the future, microenterprise, job training schemes, or other business ideas may be the most beneficial for refugees seeking to establish long-term careers in Greece. While specific policy recommendations may change over time,

the goal of seeking mutually beneficial, sustainable, and empowering policy options endures. If Greece's future policy is guided by this objective, refugees need not be threats or economic burdens, but rather integrated, self-sufficient, and contributive neighbors.

REFERENCES

- Abella, M. (2006). Policies and Best Practices for Management of Temporary Migration. *International Symposium on International Migration and Development*.
- Ager, A., & Strang, A. (2008). Understanding Integration: A Conceptual Framework. *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 21(2), 166-191. <https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/fen016>
- Akram, S. M., Noureddine, E., Kuzmova, Y., Lang, A., Bidinger, S., & Hites, D. (2015). Protecting Syrian Refugees: Laws, Policies, and Global Responsibility Sharing. *Middle East Law and Governance*, 7(3), 287-318. <https://doi.org/10.1163/18763375-00703003>
- Archer, L., Hollingworth, S., Maylor, U., Sheibani, A., & Kowarzik, U. (2005). *Challenging Barriers to Employment for Refugees and Asylum Seekers in London*.
- Arraf, J. (2016, July 22). Syrian refugees suffering on Jordan's border. *Al Jazeera*.
- Atfield G., Brahmhatt K., & O'Toole K. (2007). Refugees' Experiences of Integration. *Refugee Council and University of Birmingham*.
- Baboulias, Y. (2017, April 7). In Greece, Refugee Children Are Still Waiting for School to Start. *Refugees Deeply*. Athens.
- Baker, A. (2016, November 14). Winter Is Coming for Tens of Thousands of Refugees in Greece. *Time*. Thessaloniki.
- Bakewell, O. (2008). Research Beyond the Categories: The Importance of Policy Irrelevant Research into Forced Migration. *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 21(4). <https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/fen042>
- Bjørnlund, M. (2008). The 1914 cleansing of Aegean Greeks as a case of violent Turkification. *Journal of Genocide Research*, 10(1), 41-58. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14623520701850286>
- Black, R. (2003). Breaking the Convention: Researching the "Illegal" Migration of Refugees to Europe. *Antipode*, 35(1), 34-54. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8330.00301>

- Briant, N., & Kennedy, A. (2004). An Investigation of the Perceived Needs and Priorities Held by African Refugees in an Urban Setting in a First Country of Asylum. *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 17(4), 437-459. <https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/17.4.437>
- Castles, S. (2006). Global Perspectives on Forced Migration. *Asian and Pacific Migration Journal*, 15(1), 7-28. <https://doi.org/10.1177/011719680601500102>
- Catholic Relief Services. (2016). *Refugee and Migrant Emergency in Europe: City of Athens Shelter Analysis*.
- Central Intelligence Agency. (2017). The World Factbook – Greece. Retrieved March 27, 2017, from <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gr.html>
- Clayton, J., & Holland, H. (2015, December 30). Over one million sea arrivals reach Europe in 2015. *UNHCR*.
- Connor, P. (2016). *Record 1.3 Million Sought Asylum in Europe in 2015*.
- Darwish, K., & Magdy, W. (2015). Attitudes towards Refugees in Light of the Paris Attacks.
- Duneier, M. (2016). *Ghetto : the invention of a place, the history of an idea*.
- EASO. (2017). Questions and Answers on Relocation. Retrieved April 22, 2017, from <https://www.easo.europa.eu/questions-and-answers-relocation>
- Elmore, R. F. (1979). Backward Mapping: Implementation Research and Policy Decisions. *Political Science Quarterly*, 94(4), 601. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2149628>
- European Commission. (2012). *Special Eurobarometer 386: Europeans and their Languages*.
- European Commission. (2016a). Press release - Commission discusses draft Schengen Evaluation Report on Greece. Retrieved April 21, 2017, from http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-174_en.htm
- European Commission. (2016b). *Relocation and Resettlement – State of Play*.
- Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, E. (2014). *The Ideal Refugees: Gender, Islam, and the Sahrawi Politics of Survival*. Syracuse University Press.
- Fitzpatrick, J. (2000). Temporary Protection of Refugees: Elements of a Formalized Regime. *The American Journal of International Law*, 94(2), 279. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2555293>
- Gabriel, P., Morgan-Jonker, C., Phung, C. M. W., Barrios, R., & Kaczorowski, J. (2011). Refugees and Health Care – The Need for Data: Understanding the Health of Government-assisted Refugees in Canada Through a Prospective Longitudinal Cohort. *Canadian Journal of Public Health*, 102(4).
- Greenhill, K. M. (2016). Open Arms Behind Barred Doors: Fear, Hypocrisy and Policy Schizophrenia in the European Migration Crisis. *European Law Journal*, 22(3), 317-332. <https://doi.org/10.1111/eulj.12179>
- Greven, T. (2016). *The Rise of Right-wing Populism in Europe and the United States: A Comparative Perspective*.
- Hammerstad, A. (2011). UNHCR and the Securitization of Forced Migration. In A. Betts & G. Loescher (Eds.), *Refugees in International Relations*. Oxford University Press.
- Harrell-Bond, B. E. (1986). *Imposing Aid - Emergency Assistance to Refugees*. Oxford University Press.
- Harris, M. (2016, June 14). How Many Refugees are in Greece? Here's the Head Count Ahead of World Refugee Day. *Greek Reporter*.
- Hatton, T. J. (2015). Asylum Policy in the EU: the Case for Deeper Integration. *CESifo Economic Studies*, 61(3-4), 605-637. <https://doi.org/10.1093/cesifo/ifv002>
- Hatziprokopiou, P. (2003). Albanian immigrants in Thessaloniki, Greece: processes of economic and social incorporation. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 29(6), 1033-1057. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183032000171357>
- Heisbourg, F. (2015). The Strategic Implications of the Syrian Refugee Crisis. *Survival*, 57(6), 7-20. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2015.1116144>
- Hobfoll, S. E. (1998). *Stress, culture, and community: the psychology and philosophy of stress*. Plenum Press.
- Hollands, M. (2001). Upon Closer Acquaintance: The Impact of Direct Contact with Refugees on Dutch Hosts. *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 14(3), 295-314. <https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/14.3.295>
- Holman, Z. (2016, October 28). Rekindling fears: right-wing violence against migrants is back in Greece – New Internationalist. *New Internationalist*.
- Hovil, L. (2014). Local Integration. In E. Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, G. Loescher, K. Long, N. Sigona, & L. Hovil (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies*. Oxford University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199652433.013.0042>

- Hynes, P. (2009). Contemporary Compulsory Dispersal and the Absence of Space for the Restoration of Trust. *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 22(1).
- Jacobsen, K., & Landau, L. B. (2003). The Dual Imperative in Refugee Research: Some Methodological and Ethical Considerations in Social Science Research on Forced Migration. *Disasters*, 27(3), 185-206. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-7717.00228>
- Kapa Research Centre. (2014). *December 2013 Nationwide Poll*.
- Kiagia, M., Kriona, M., & Georgaca, E. (2010). Social Integration of Refugees and Asylum Applicants in Greece. *Hellenic Journal of Psychology*, 7.
- Kingsley, P. (2016, March 23). Refugee crisis: key aid agencies refuse any role in "mass expulsion." *The Guardian*.
- Korac, M. (2001). Cross-ethnic networks, self-reception system, and functional integration of refugees from the former Yugoslavia in Rome. *Journal of International Migration and Integration / Revue de L'integration et de La Migration Internationale*, 2(1), 1-26. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12134-001-1017-9>
- Korac, M. (2003). Integration and How We Facilitate It: A Comparative Study of the Settlement Experiences of Refugees in Italy and the Netherlands. *Sociology*, 3737030387(11).
- Kousoulis, A. A., Tsoucalas, G., & Sgantzios, M. (2017). A Solution to Refugee Children Healthcare in Greece. *Journal of Immigrant and Minority Health*. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10903-017-0567-7>
- Lawrance, B. N. (2016). The Impact of Framing Migration as Crisis. Retrieved April 22, 2017, from <http://southwritlarge.com/articles/the-impact-of-framing-migration-as-crisis/>
- Lipsky, M. (1980). Street-level bureaucracy: The critical role of street-level bureaucrats. *Classics of Public Administration*.
- Long, K. (2014). Rethinking "Durable" Solutions. In E. Fiddian-Qasmiyeh & G. Loescher (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies*. Oxford University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199652433.013.0013>
- Losi, N., & Strang, A. (2008). *IntagraRef: Local communities and refugees, fostering social integration*. Edinburgh.
- Makris, A. (2017, April 3). About 10,000 Asylum Seekers will Remain in Greece, Says Head of Asylum Service | GreekReporter.com. *Greek Reporter*.
- Migration Policy Centre. (2016). Syrian Refugees. Retrieved April 21, 2017, from <http://syrianrefugees.eu/>
- MIPEX. (2015). Greece | MIPEX 2015. Retrieved April 21, 2017, from <http://www.mipex.eu/greece>
- Nallu, P. (2016, October 3). Greece: Afghan refugees in Elliniko face camp closure. *Al Jazeera*. Athens.
- Nardelli, A. (2015, September 20). Greece election result: the key numbers. *The Guardian*.
- Newbold, K. B., Cho, J., & McKeary, M. (2013). Access to Health Care: The Experiences of Refugee and Refugee Claimant Women in Hamilton, Ontario. *Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies*, 11(4), 431-449.
- OECD. (2015). *How are refugees faring on the labour market in Europe?*
- OECD. (2016). *OECD Employment Outlook 2016* (OECD Employment Outlook). OECD Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1787/empl_outlook-2016-en
- Papadimitriou, P. N., & Papageorgiou, I. F. (2005). The New "Dubliners": Implementation of European Council Regulation 343/2003 (Dublin-II) by the Greek Authorities. *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 18(3), 299-318. <https://doi.org/10.1093/refuge/fei033>
- Papadopoulou, A. (2002). *Kurdish Asylum Seekers in Greece: the Role of Networks in the Migration Process*. University of Oxford.
- Pavlou, M., & Christopoulou, N. (2008). *Athens: City of Migrants*.
- Psaropoulos, J. (2016, March 7). Europe shuts its doors to Afghans. *Al Jazeera*. Athens.
- Puggioni, R. (2005). Refugees, Institutional Invisibility, and Self-Help Strategies: Evaluating Kurdish Experience in Rome. *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 18(3), 319-339. <https://doi.org/10.1093/refuge/fei034>
- Reuters. (2016, February 16). Greece prepares refugee 'hotspots' amid growing EU pressure. *Reuters*.
- Roman, E., Baird, T., & Radcliffe, T. (2016). *Why Turkey is Not a "Safe Country."*
- Scheel, S., & Squire, V. (2014). Forced Migrants as Illegal Migrants. In E. Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, G. Loescher, K. Long, & N. Sig (Eds.), *Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies*. Oxford University Press.

- Schuster, L. (2011). Turning refugees into "illegal migrants": Afghan asylum seekers in Europe. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 34(8), 1392-1407. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2010.535550>
- Sitaropoulos, N. (2002). Refugee welfare in Greece: towards a remodelling of the responsibility-shifting paradigm? *Critical Social Policy*, 22(3), 436-455. <https://doi.org/10.1177/026101830202200304>
- Smith, H. L. (2016, March 31). Turks shoot to kill as refugees cross border. *The Times*.
- Squires, N. (2016, October 11). Greek parents padlock school against refugee children as education plan gets underway. *The Telegraph*. Rome.
- Stamouli, N. (2015). Crisis in Greece – The Numbers. Retrieved April 21, 2017, from <https://blogs.wsj.com/briefly/2015/01/20/crisis-in-greece-the-numbers/>
- Stanton, N. (2017). New Data Highlights Human Rights Violations Faced by Refugees in Greece. Retrieved April 21, 2017, from <http://refugeerights.org.uk/press-release-24-january-2017/>
- Stein, B. N. (1986). Durable Solutions for Developing Country Refugees. *International Migration Review*, 20(2), 264. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2546035>
- Strang, A., & Ager, A. (2010). Refugee Integration: Emerging Trends and Remaining Agendas. *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 23(4), 589-607. <https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/feq046>
- Stubbs, P. (1995). Creative negotiations: concepts and practice of integration of refugees, displaced people and local communities in Croatia. In *War, Exile, Everyday Life*. Zagreb: IEF.
- Tomlinson, F., & Egan, S. (2002). From Marginalization to (Dis)Empowerment: Organizing Training and Employment Services for Refugees. *Human Relations*, 55(8), 1019-1043. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0018726702055008182>
- Tsaliki, E. (2016). Presentation of the Intercultural Schools in Greece: Promoting Intercultural and Citizenship Issues? *Journal Plus Education*, 14(1), 348-365.
- UNESCO. (2012). *Greece Student teacher ratio, primary school*.
- UNHCR. Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (1951). UNHCR.
- UNHCR. (1997). *UNHCR Comprehensive Policy on Urban Refugees*. Geneva.
- UNHCR. (2016). Syria Regional Refugee Response. Retrieved June 24, 2016, from <http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php>
- UNHCR. (2017a). *Mediterranean arrival data 2017. Operational Portal: Refugee Situations*.
- UNHCR. (2017b). *Weekly Accommodation Update: March 21, 2017*.
- US Department of State. (2011). Greece: Executive Summary. In *International Religious Freedom Report*. United States Department of State.
- Valtonen, K. (1998). Resettlement of Middle Eastern Refugees in Finland: The Elusiveness of Integration. *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 11(1), 38-60. <https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/11.1.38>
- Voutira, E., & Dona, G. (2007). Refugee Research Methodologies: Consolidation and Transformation of a Field. *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 20(2), 163-171. <https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/fem017>