{"id":924,"date":"2015-09-14T05:01:33","date_gmt":"2015-09-14T05:01:33","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/sites.nyuad.nyu.edu\/jss\/?p=924"},"modified":"2021-06-12T13:27:53","modified_gmt":"2021-06-12T13:27:53","slug":"intentions-matter-avenging-second-and-third-party-punishment","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/sites.nyuad.nyu.edu\/jss\/intentions-matter-avenging-second-and-third-party-punishment\/","title":{"rendered":"Intentions Matter: Avenging Second and Third-Party Punishment | Marek Mihok"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>A number of previous experimental studies have shown that punished individuals are willing to counter-punish at a cost, even in one-shot interactions. Counter-punishers target both, second- party punishers (i.e. individuals directly affected by the violation of a social norm) as well as third- party punishers (i.e. individuals not directly affected by the violation of a social norm). Using a modified dictator game I show that the extent of counter-punishment on second parties is significantly greater than on third parties. I explore different possible explanations for the willingness to counter-punish. I find some evidence suggesting that counter-punishment is meted out by the most anti-social of individuals who are also willing to take the most from the second party participants.<\/p>\n<p>Read article <a href=\"https:\/\/sites.nyuad.nyu.edu\/jss\/wp-content\/uploads\/2015\/09\/mihok-punishment.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">here<\/a>.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p><a href=\"https:\/\/sites.nyuad.nyu.edu\/jss\/wp-content\/uploads\/2015\/09\/gobena-heroin.pdf\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/sites.nyuad.nyu.edu\/jss\/wp-content\/uploads\/2014\/05\/abstract.jpg\" alt=\"abstract\" width=\"18\" height=\"20\" \/><\/a>\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/sites.nyuad.nyu.edu\/jss\/wp-content\/uploads\/2015\/09\/gobena-heroin.pdf\">Abstract<\/a>\u00a0\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/sites.nyuad.nyu.edu\/jss\/wp-content\/uploads\/2015\/09\/mihok-punishment.pdf\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/sites.nyuad.nyu.edu\/jss\/wp-content\/uploads\/2014\/05\/pdf.jpg\" alt=\"pdf\" width=\"18\" height=\"20\" \/><\/a>\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/sites.nyuad.nyu.edu\/jss\/wp-content\/uploads\/2015\/09\/mihok-punishment.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">PDF<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":5,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[70,29],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-924","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-articles","category-politicalscience"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/sites.nyuad.nyu.edu\/jss\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/924","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/sites.nyuad.nyu.edu\/jss\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/sites.nyuad.nyu.edu\/jss\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sites.nyuad.nyu.edu\/jss\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/5"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sites.nyuad.nyu.edu\/jss\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=924"}],"version-history":[{"count":6,"href":"https:\/\/sites.nyuad.nyu.edu\/jss\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/924\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1999,"href":"https:\/\/sites.nyuad.nyu.edu\/jss\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/924\/revisions\/1999"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/sites.nyuad.nyu.edu\/jss\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=924"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sites.nyuad.nyu.edu\/jss\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=924"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sites.nyuad.nyu.edu\/jss\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=924"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}