{"id":969,"date":"2015-10-11T06:15:04","date_gmt":"2015-10-11T06:15:04","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/sites.nyuad.nyu.edu\/jss\/?p=969"},"modified":"2026-10-19T14:07:13","modified_gmt":"2026-10-19T14:07:13","slug":"lim-gst","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/sites.nyuad.nyu.edu\/jss\/lim-gst\/","title":{"rendered":"How do Goal Setting and Different Reward Schemes Affect Goal Achievement in Public Goods Games?"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<!-- JSS Scholar metadata v1: Google Scholar and search data. Keep this block first. -->\n<meta name=\"citation_title\" content=\"How do Goal Setting and Different Reward Schemes Affect Goal Achievement in Public Goods Games?\"\/>\n<meta name=\"citation_author\" content=\"Alf Lim\"\/>\n<meta name=\"citation_author_institution\" content=\"New York University Abu Dhabi\"\/>\n<meta name=\"citation_publication_date\" content=\"2015\/10\/11\"\/>\n<meta name=\"citation_online_date\" content=\"2015\/10\/11\"\/>\n<meta name=\"citation_journal_title\" content=\"NYU Abu Dhabi Journal of Social Sciences\"\/>\n<meta name=\"citation_publisher\" content=\"New York University Abu Dhabi\"\/>\n<meta name=\"citation_language\" content=\"en\"\/>\n<meta name=\"citation_abstract_html_url\" content=\"https:\/\/sites.nyuad.nyu.edu\/jss\/lim-gst\/\"\/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\">{\"@context\":\"https:\/\/schema.org\",\"@type\":\"ScholarlyArticle\",\"headline\":\"How do Goal Setting and Different Reward Schemes Affect Goal Achievement in Public Goods Games?\",\"name\":\"How do Goal Setting and Different Reward Schemes Affect Goal Achievement in Public Goods Games?\",\"author\":[{\"@type\":\"Person\",\"name\":\"Alf Lim\",\"affiliation\":{\"@type\":\"CollegeOrUniversity\",\"name\":\"New York University Abu Dhabi\"}}],\"datePublished\":\"2015-10-11\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/sites.nyuad.nyu.edu\/jss\/lim-gst\/\",\"mainEntityOfPage\":\"https:\/\/sites.nyuad.nyu.edu\/jss\/lim-gst\/\",\"inLanguage\":\"en\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@type\":\"Periodical\",\"name\":\"NYU Abu Dhabi Journal of Social Sciences\",\"alternateName\":\"NYUAD Journal of Social Sciences\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/sites.nyuad.nyu.edu\/jss\/\",\"publisher\":{\"@type\":\"CollegeOrUniversity\",\"name\":\"New York University Abu Dhabi\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/nyuad.nyu.edu\/\"}},\"publisher\":{\"@type\":\"CollegeOrUniversity\",\"name\":\"New York University Abu Dhabi\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/nyuad.nyu.edu\/\"},\"abstract\":\"The public goods game captures the social dilemma between cooperative behavior and free riding, which is often found in teamwork in various different organizations. Unfortunately, free riding is the dominant strategy in these situations unless different treatment effects are applied. This paper examines whether goal-setting theory (including voting on a difficult and specific exogenous goal, performance feedback, and incremental and lump-sum reward schemes) from motivational psychology can be utilized for groups as a coordination mechanism to curb falling cooperation rates in the standard public goods games. This research found that goal setting was unable to increase and sustain cooperation rates for groups, regardless of the reward scheme implemented. Furthermore, our operationalization of goal-setting theory to the public goods game seems to have weakened the goal commitment on the group level. Therefore, in comparison to the baseline, goal setting decreases the overall cooperation and performance.\"}<\/script>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"jss-byline citation_author wp-block-paragraph\">Alf Lim<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"jss-citeline wp-block-paragraph\">NYU Abu Dhabi Journal of Social Sciences, October 2015<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"jss-abstract-label wp-block-paragraph\">Abstract<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"page\" title=\"Page 1\">\r\n<div class=\"layoutArea\">\r\n<div class=\"column\">\r\n\r\nThe public goods game captures the social dilemma between cooperative behavior and free riding, which is often found in teamwork in various different organizations. Unfortunately, free riding is the dominant strategy in these situations unless different treatment effects are applied. This paper examines whether goal-setting theory (including voting on a difficult and specific exogenous goal, performance feedback, and incremental and lump-sum reward schemes) from motivational psychology can be utilized for groups as a coordination mechanism to curb falling cooperation rates in the standard public goods games. This research found that goal setting was unable to increase and sustain cooperation rates for groups, regardless of the reward scheme implemented. Furthermore, our operationalization of goal-setting theory to the public goods game seems to have weakened the goal commitment on the group level. Therefore, in comparison to the baseline, goal setting decreases the overall cooperation and performance.\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\nRead the <a href=\"https:\/\/drive.google.com\/a\/nyu.edu\/file\/d\/0B-VaMX5fZysMQVIyd0dpcUFvZHM\/view?usp=sharing\">full article<\/a>.\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Alf Lim NYU Abu Dhabi Journal of Social Sciences, October 2015 Abstract The public goods game captures the social dilemma between cooperative behavior and free riding, which is often found in teamwork in various different organizations. Unfortunately, free riding is the dominant strategy in these situations unless different treatment effects are applied. This paper examines [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":5,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[70,21],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-969","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-articles","category-economics"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/sites.nyuad.nyu.edu\/jss\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/969","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/sites.nyuad.nyu.edu\/jss\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/sites.nyuad.nyu.edu\/jss\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sites.nyuad.nyu.edu\/jss\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/5"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sites.nyuad.nyu.edu\/jss\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=969"}],"version-history":[{"count":5,"href":"https:\/\/sites.nyuad.nyu.edu\/jss\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/969\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":2496,"href":"https:\/\/sites.nyuad.nyu.edu\/jss\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/969\/revisions\/2496"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/sites.nyuad.nyu.edu\/jss\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=969"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sites.nyuad.nyu.edu\/jss\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=969"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sites.nyuad.nyu.edu\/jss\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=969"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}